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ABSTRACT 
 
STEPHEN BRADLEY VAISEY: Three Essays on Moral Culture 
(under the direction of Andrew J. Perrin and Christian Smith) 
 
The goal of this dissertation is to examine empirically the role that morality plays 
in social life. The first two chapters use data from the National Study of Youth and 
Religion to investigate the role that different understandings of good and bad, right and 
wrong, play in shaping the lives of U.S. teenagers. The first chapter advances a new 
theoretical model for understanding the role that moral cultures play in shaping action. 
Drawing on sociological practice theories and work in cognitive science, it outlines a 
“dual process theory of culture in action,” which holds that most cultural motivation 
operates at an unconscious level. Consistent with this model, the data analysis shows that 
individualist moralities tend to foster both more drug use and less civic engagement even 
though evidence from in-depth suggests that teenagers are largely unable to articulate 
these moral differences. The second chapter explores how different moral understandings 
shape social interaction over time. An analyses of ego network data between 2002 and 
2005 demonstrates that teenagers with different moral understandings develop friendship 
networks with different proportions of drug users, those who frequently get in trouble, 
and regular volunteers. Once again, there is evidence that individualist moralities tend to 
promote more association with deviant peers and less association with civically engaged 
peers. The final chapter uses data from Benjamin Zablocki’s Urban Communes Project to 
explore the relationship between shared moral worldview and community. An analysis of 
 v 
data from 50 urban communes collected in 1974 shows that shared moral order is the best 
predictor of the degree to which a group’s participants experience it as a true community. 
Further analyses using fuzzy set methods, however, show that shared moral order must 
work together with specific structural arrangements in order to ensure the experience of 
community. Taken together, these studies suggest that morality is a vital dimension of 
social life that deserves further investigation by sociologists. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Culture is everywhere. After two or three decades of focusing almost exclusively 
on “hard” social structures like occupation and class, sociologists have once again turned 
toward thinking about the world of ideas, beliefs, and symbols. Researchers who study 
everything from economic markets to social movements to religion are abuzz about 
cultural toolkits, repertoires, narratives, discourse, framing, and more. All this talk about 
culture, however, masks a single glaring fact: there is no current theory of culture that 
takes seriously its causal role. In the current thinking, culture is something people use to 
solve problems, to make sense of their lives, and to justify their actions and choices to 
others when socially required. It is learned in fragmented bits and then “deployed” and 
“mobilized” in strategic ways. Despite the many virtues of this approach, it has come at a 
high cost. We no longer have a compelling account of how culture might independently 
motivate and give direction to individual action rather than merely playing a 
“channeling” role for structural imperatives or a legitimating role for the pursuit of 
expected utility. For this reason, current theories of culture are less than useful for 
helping us solve the puzzle of why certain people choose to do some things rather than 
others. 
The goal of this dissertation is to present three pieces of research that take 
seriously the specifically causal role that culture can play in human life. My particular 
focus here is on moral culture. This term has two parts, and I will attempt to define both. 
First, I follow Christian Smith (2003:8) and adopt Charles Taylor’s definition of morality, 
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which is “discriminations of right and wrong, better or worse, higher or lower, which are 
not rendered valid by our own desires, inclinations, or choices, but rather stand 
independently of these and offer standards by which they can be judged.” Second, by 
culture, I refer to patterns of meanings that are thematically shared by social groups, thus 
excluding purely individual or idiosyncratic mental contents. Therefore by moral culture 
I refer to widely available themes for thinking about right and wrong, better or worse, and 
so on. The three papers in this dissertation have the common goal of trying to understand 
how these shared themes shape outcomes in different areas of social life. 
Chapter 1, “Toward a Dual-Process Theory of Culture in Action,” outlines the 
theoretical case for understanding cultural causation at the micro level and provides an 
empirical demonstration of the theory’s usefulness. Building on an engagement between 
the sociological practice theories of Giddens and Bourdieu, on the one hand, and dual-
process theories of cognition on the other, the theory moves toward a better 
understanding of how culture can both motivate behavior and justify it after the fact. In 
the process, I argue that this theory is able to make sense of contradictory findings from 
quantitative and qualitative methods as well as between subfields like the sociology of 
religion and the sociology of culture. More specifically, using data from two waves of the 
National Study of Youth and Religion, this paper shows that different moral 
understandings are associated with different trajectories in marijuana use and 
volunteering, with “individualist” teenagers more likely to engage in the former, and less 
likely to engage in the latter. 
Chapter 2, “Moral Cultures and Network Composition,” takes the argument in 
Chapter 1 a step further. Rather than arguing that moral understandings are able to shape 
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behavior net of the social context, I argue in this paper that moral understandings are also 
able to shape that context over time. Also using Waves 1 and 2 of the National Study of 
Youth and Religion, this paper looks at how different moral worldviews shape the 
composition of social networks over time. In parallel to the findings of Chapter 1, this 
research finds that, relative to community and religious worldviews, individualist moral 
worldviews lead to increases in the number of friends who use drugs and are often in 
trouble and decreases in the number of friends that are regular volunteers. Taken 
together, then, Chapters 1 and 2 strongly suggest that differences in moral-cultural 
worldviews translate into different behavioral and interactional trajectories. 
Chapter 3, “Structure, Culture, and Community,” looks at moral culture at a 
different level of analysis. Here, rather than considering processes at the individual level, 
the cases are urban communes from the mid-1970s. Rather than considering the 
substantive content of moral cultures, at issue in this chapter are the consequences of the 
formal property of moral-cultural sharedness. Specifically, this paper looks at how shared 
ideology is related to the experience of community among each group’s members. Using 
multivariate regression, the findings show that a shared moral worldview is the single 
best predictor of whether or not the group manifests a high degree of “we-feeling.” 
Interestingly, the regression results show that other factors like authority and extent of 
interaction have either null or negative effects when shared moral order is controlled. 
Fuzzy set techniques supplement these findings in three ways. First, they show that 
strong moral orders almost always co-occur with structural characteristics that support 
them. Second, they show that strong moral orders must join with structural characteristics 
to be sufficient to produce the we-feeling. Third, they suggest that moral order, while not 
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a strictly necessary condition for producing the we-feeling, is a necessary part of all the 
causal recipes that do produce it. 
Though these pieces of research address different outcomes and levels of analysis, 
they point to a common conclusion: that culture is vital for understanding why some 
things happen and others do not. The current understandings of culture as “repertoires of 
justification” (Boltanksi and Thévenot 2006) or “toolkits” (Swidler 2001) are not 
sufficient to model the role that cultural differences play in social life. It is my hope that 
the research contained in this dissertation will help promote debate and help move 
sociology toward a more robust understanding of how culture matters. 
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CHAPTER 1: TOWARD A DUAL PROCESS THEORY OF CULTURE IN 
ACTION 
This paper seeks to move toward a more satisfactory answer to a simple question: 
What role do cultural beliefs play in people’s behavior? Contemporary sociologists who 
care about this question—mainly those who study culture and religion—are necessarily 
nagged by a basic theoretical confusion. One the one hand, scholars claim that cultural 
beliefs about what is good or bad, right or wrong, are tools that people use to solve their 
everyday problems. According to this view, culture is best viewed as a loose repertoire of 
justifications that rationalize or make sense of the choices that individuals make in their 
lives (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999; Swidler 2001). On the other hand, the idea that 
cultural beliefs or values play a motivational role in shaping behavior remains, primarily 
in studies of religion (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004; Lakoff 2002; Smith 2003; Smith and 
Denton 2005). Even there, however, this perspective is declining somewhat, as many 
researchers are beginning to apply the notion of problem-solving “repertoire” to religious 
beliefs (Bartkowski and Read 2003; Clydesdale 1997; Emerson and Smith 2000; Lamont, 
Schmalzbauer, Waller and Weber 1996; Smilde 2005). While motivational and 
justificatory understandings of culture are not necessarily contradictory, the choice to 
apply one or the other to a specific empirical problem seems largely a matter of the 
researcher’s personal preference (Jackson 2006). There is little sense of how one might 
coherently combine the intuitively appealing possibility that culture matters both as a 
social and psychological justification and as a motivation for action. The goal of this 
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paper is to take one step toward synthesizing these two distinct conceptualizations of 
culture by offering a dual-process model of cultural cognition.  
My argument has four parts. First, I briefly outline the history of the motivation/ 
justification split in cultural theory and show that both the older Weberian/Parsonian and 
the newer toolkit or repertoire views of culture make the assumption that the link between 
beliefs and behavior are to be found in conscious thought. I outline some compelling 
reasons to question this assumption. 
Second, I introduce insights from sociological “practice theories” and research in 
psychology and neuroscience that may provide a useful and empirically-grounded 
synthesis of the motivational and justificatory perspective. I offer a heuristic model that 
distinguishes between automatic and deliberative cognition and considers the relationship 
of each to cultural beliefs. I argue that while most moral justification occurs at the 
conscious level, most moral evaluation occurs below the level of conscious awareness. 
This suggests that we can profitably extend Bourdieu’s concept of habitus from the realm 
of “good art” and “good music” to “the good” more generally. 
Third, I consider some of the substantive and practical implications of the model 
sketched in part two. Because there is good reason to believe that practical consciousness 
is more operative in everyday behavior, surveys (which rely more on implicit knowledge) 
may be better suited than interviews for investigating the belief-behavior link. Taken by 
themselves, interview methods (relying as they do on discursive cognition that is 
specialized for social justification) may produce results that exaggerate the incoherence 
of cultural forms and downplay the motivational role of moral culture. 
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Fourth, I provide an empirical illustration of the model using both interview and 
longitudinal survey data from the National Study of Youth and Religion. This exercise 
demonstrates the consistency and usefulness of the dual-process model. The empirical 
results specifically show that, net of a host of structural controls, young people who 
identified with relational (i.e., community-based) and theistic moral worldviews in 2002 
were much less likely to use drugs and much more likely to volunteer in 2005 than those 
who had endorsed individualist moral schemas. I conclude by suggesting some practical 
ways to improve empirical research and theory in the sociological study of culture and 
religion. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Tracing the Split between Motivation and Justification 
Once upon a time, sociologists believed that people were motivated by the values 
they learned from society. From Weber’s zweckrationalitat to Parsons’ voluntarist theory 
of action, the idea that consciously desired ends provide the motivation for individual 
behavior was a building block of sociological theory (see Campbell 2006). Culture was 
held to be the repository of those values which were transmitted via socialization from 
parents, schools, and churches to children (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004; Joas 1996, 2000). A 
few decades ago, however, this assumption began to undergo a sustained critique from a 
number of sources. 
Though C. Wright Mills questioned the causal power of moral beliefs as early as 
1940, his position did not become mainstream until more than four decades later. Mills’ 
(1940) view that cultural beliefs provide justifications rather than motivations for 
 9 
behavior found its most influential proponent in Ann Swidler, who famously critiqued 
values as “the unmoved mover in the theory of action” (Swidler 1986, p. 274).1 In some 
respects this was a bold claim, but in others, it was an idea whose time had arrived. Just 
as Swidler’s essay was published in the American Sociological Review, social movement 
scholars, for example, were moving away from the idea of ideological motivation toward 
a notion of “framing” as persuasive social practice (e.g., Snow, Rochford, Worden and 
Benford 1986). Around the same time, Goffman’s “dramaturgical” perspective—which 
focuses on the ways actors manipulate symbols and appearances—had reached the height 
of its popularity.2 Consistent with their larger theoretical project, symbolic interactionists 
disregarded any thought of subjective states in favor of intersubjective states; from there, 
it is a short jump to conclude that beliefs are the product of the situation rather than a 
possible influence upon them (Campbell 1996). 
In other quarters, scholars enamored of the Marxist perspective were beginning to 
take culture seriously—not as a causal factor in its own right, but as a necessary 
prerequisite for the expression of material imperatives (Bourdieu 1984). Scott and 
Lyman’s (1968) influential paper on “accounts” was amplified by neo-institutionalists 
who emphasize cultural legitimacy as an external environment of action that otherwise 
rational organizations have to face rather than as shaping action in any motivational way 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977; see also Alexander 2003:23). 
Rethinking culture as a tool of social sense-making instead of a motive force was not 
                                                 
1
 For brevity and clarity, I focus the discussion around the work of Ann Swidler (1986, 2001), undoubtedly 
the most well-known and exemplary member of the “justificatory” or “situationalist” school among 
sociological students of culture. For a much more comprehensive account of the rise of “situationalism” in 
action theory, see Campbell (1996). 
 
2
 As reflected among other things in Goffman’s 1982 election to the presidency of the American 
Sociological Association. 
 10 
confined to any single subfield, but was simply part of the sociological zeitgeist in the 
mid-1980s. 
Yet Swidler’s critique was not simply fashionable or faddish. It was based on two 
key empirical observations. The first was a novel and highly insightful interpretation of 
Weber’s Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Swidler argued that while the 
ideology of Protestantism (e.g., the concern with glorifying God through work) gave way 
to that of capitalism, the practices—thrift, industry, and so on—persisted. From this, she 
concludes that what survive and causally matter are not primarily ideas or beliefs, but 
“strategies of action”; in other words, the behavioral habits, styles, and skills that actors 
bring to bear on the problems of everyday life. 
This societal-level realization was further strengthened by a second, more “micro” 
observation, one that was not fully codified until her 2001 book, Talk of Love. This 
second insight is that individuals are remarkably bad at giving consistent reasons for or 
explanations of their behavior. In her discussions about marriage with middle-class 
Americans, she found little evidence that ideology or beliefs motivate action. Rather, she 
found that people tend “to trim their philosophy to fit their action commitments” (2001, 
p. 148). That is, people embedded in different social networks and under different kinds 
of institutional pressures may act differently in their marriages, but the reasons they give 
for their actions are efficacious only in that they “make sense” of these actions, both to 
network alters and to the actors themselves. In this view, even one’s one self or identity is 
not causally consequential for behavior. Evangelical Protestants, for example, as just as 
likely as others—Swidler argues—to understand their marriages through a framework of 
“what makes me happy.” Though Swidler outlines three types of selves—utilitarian, 
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attuned, and disciplined—she does not accord these self-constructions any motivational 
power. Instead, the self is simply “one of many tools” a person may “pick up or put 
down” in the course of social interaction (2001, p. 24). According to the toolkit or 
repertoire model, this is “how culture matters.”  
It should be noted here that though Swidler is the most oft-cited proponent of the 
toolkit or repertoire approach to culture, her view is by no means idiosyncratic (see 
Campbell 1996; Hechter et al. 1999). For example, Boltanski and Thévenot (1999) refer 
to moral justification as a socially required sense-making phenomenon; DiMaggio (1997, 
2002) argues that we grab bits of culture seemingly at random to justify ourselves; 
Lamont (1992) sees symbolic repertoires serving primarily as tools of social inclusion 
and exclusion; and Lichterman (1996) claims that moral languages are simply different 
ways of talking while we go about the “life-ways” (action habits or customs) we learn in 
organizations and networks. Even scholars who might not identify with the “justificatory” 
school tend to assume a priori that the pressure to maintain particular beliefs is social 
rather than intrapsychic (e.g., Martin 2000). Though the terminology may differ, most 
sociologists now see culture as rationalizing or making sense of action rather than 
motivating it (Hechter et al. 1999). Swidler is simply the recent theorist who has done the 
most to work out an explicit formulation of this view. 
 
An Unstated Premise of “Toolkit Theory” 
The intellectual history of the justificatory view is too complex to trace here, but 
Swidler (2001) nicely sums up its logic. The argument goes something like this: people 
generally pursue consistent lines of action; however, when asked to explain these lines of 
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action, people invariably give contradictory or incoherent accounts of their motives. 
Being contradictory, the accounts themselves cannot really be motivating and we must 
therefore turn outside the person’s subjectivity to find the true springs of action. These 
springs of action are found in institutions, because they have the power to control 
“departures from the [institutionalized] pattern” via application of “rewards and 
sanctions” (Jepperson, quoted in Swidler 2001). Therefore institutions both large (e.g., 
the legal structure of marriage) and small (e.g., my friends) are what drive action, while 
culture is what helps makes sense of these actions.3 
This argument for toolkit theory is simple, insightful, and elegant. It turns out, 
however, that it is also based on unrealistic assumptions about the necessary cognitive 
link between cultural beliefs and motivation. Swidler assumes that if cultural beliefs 
were, in fact, motivational, they would have to be grounded in articulable, rule-like 
cognitive structures. Moreover, she assumes that if beliefs were motives we would find 
consistency between the moral beliefs people articulate and their subsequent actions. 
(That is, if people really believed in the romantic model of marriage, they would divorce 
the instant their marriage no longer promised fulfillment.) Failing to find either pattern, 
Swidler concludes that the contradictory beliefs her informants articulate must be 
causally unrelated to action itself. DiMaggio (1997, 2002) makes a similar point. He 
argues that people indeed know a lot more culture than they use, and that much of this 
cultural information is contradictory and stored away without reference to its truth value. 
It follows from this reasoning that the cultural schemas people internalize (being 
                                                 
3
 It is not tenable to suggest here that toolkit theorists are only interested in post hoc “sense making” and 
are unconcerned with the processes—subjective or otherwise—that give rise to action itself. As I have 
shown above, toolkit theory is founded in an express denial of the causal power of subjective states (Mills 
1940; Scott and Lyman 1968; Swidler 1986; see also Campbell 1996; Hechter et al. 1999). 
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contradictory) cannot themselves be the reasons behind observed behavior. Consistent 
with the institutional and network focus of toolkit theory, DiMaggio maintains that we 
should look to the “external environment” for the social cues that activate particular 
cultural schemas rather than others in different situations. 
The power of this argument is in its simplicity, yet accepting it, as I will show, 
also requires accepting an unstated premise: that moral decision-making (were it to 
occur) would have to be a deliberative, conscious affair. One the face of it, this premise 
seems uncontroversial. The primary moral philosophical tradition going back to Kant 
holds that moral judgment is a matter of logical reasoning. In a more recent incarnation, 
the dominant empirical research program on moral psychology makes the same 
assumption, and asks people to reason deliberately through moral dilemmas in order to 
arrive at correct decisions (Kohlberg 1981). Even utilitarianism, the main philosophical 
competitor to the Kantian, deontological approach, prescribes extensive mathematical 
computation about the relative happiness that a decision will confer on oneself and others 
(Haidt 2005).4 Given its distinguished intellectual heritage, one can hardly fault toolkit 
and repertoire theorists for not questioning the unstated premise that morality relies on 
conscious deliberation, either regarding one’s duty or in order to maximize personal or 
collective utility.  
Yet there are, in fact, very serious reasons to question it. Over the past decade or 
so, many scholars have reached a consensus that recognizes two primary levels of 
consciousness—deliberative and automatic—and understands that most of our 
evaluations and decision-making occur below the level of conscious awareness. I will 
                                                 
4
 Incidentally, the battle between deontological and utilitarian approaches to morality also took on 
sociological form, respectively, in normative (Parsons, Durkheim) and instrumentalist (rational choice) 
theories of action (see Joas 1996). 
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outline this evidence from two different directions. I begin with insights from the 
“practice theories” of Giddens and Bourdieu. Though these theorists have many 
followers, their insights into the dual nature of consciousness have either largely been 
neglected or treated as an optional “point of view.” Next, I provide a brief overview of 
developments in psychology and neuroscience that confirm and clarify the prescient 
insights of these sociological theorists. Because of the lack of links between sociology 
and these disciplines, it is no surprise that cultural sociologists have not been aware of 
these developments. (Plus, as DiMaggio [1997] rightly points out, the “interpretivist” 
style of most cultural sociologists does not lend itself to integrating the “positivist” 
research findings of cognitive scientists.) After outlining the evidence for dual-process 
theory, I return to repertoire theory, question it in light of this discussion, and discuss 
several empirical and methodological implications of the comparison. 
 
“THE DIVIDED SELF” 
Practice Theories in Sociology 
Giddens (1984) was among the first contemporary sociological theorists to 
highlight the difference between discursive and practical levels of consciousness.5 His 
concern with the “stratified self” emerged from an insightful critique of Goffman, who 
famously demonstrated that people go out of their way to manage appearances and 
coordinate face-saving rituals. Giddens argues that though Goffman’s work is indeed 
                                                 
5
 Camic (1986) offers an important discussion of the concept of “habit” in early sociological theory. In light 
of that discussion, I certainly do not argue here that Giddens and Bourdieu were the first to take “practical 
consciousness” seriously. I focus on these two “practice theorists,” however, because their work in this area 
has broad contemporary influence and its general familiarity will spare the necessity of establishing in 
detail their position on the subject. 
 
 15 
brilliant, it lacks an important ingredient—an account of motivation. While Goffman 
focuses on how people manage their self-presentation, and maintain order in their lives, 
Giddens asks, Why on earth do people go through all this trouble? Drawing on Erickson 
and Freud, Giddens argues that motivation is unconscious, and grounded in what he calls 
the need for “ontological security”—a sense that the world is meaningful and stable. 
Pierre Bourdieu’s work also provides an account that relies on the power of 
unconscious dispositions. In Distinction, for instance, Bourdieu argues that the 
inclination to pursue different types of art, music, and literature, is not conscious at all. 
Rather, he seems to suggest that these motives come from an unconscious tendency to 
reproduce one’s class position (Bourdieu 1984).6 Whereas I might argue that I love 
beauty and excellence for its own sake, my pursuit and enjoyment of high culture are 
unconsciously motivated by my class position and tend to recreate it. Though Bourdieu’s 
field theory is more general than this (see Martin 2003), it is vital to remember that 
according to Bourdieu himself, the unconscious dispositions of the habitus cannot be 
understood without simultaneous reference to capital and field—or more specifically, to 
one’s position in the field generated by the intersection of economic and cultural capital 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Thus, while Giddens grounds unconscious motivation in 
the need for ontological security, Bourdieu grounds an actor’s dispositions towards action 
in the deployment and reproduction of one’s mix of capitals. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 See Bourdieu’s Logic of Practice (1990) for a more general version of this argument. 
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Neuroscience and Psychology 
Though the practice theories of Giddens and Bourdieu differ from one another in 
some respects, cognitive science has confirmed their shared insight into the stratified 
nature of consciousness. There is neither the space nor the need to conduct a thorough 
review of the related literature here, since there are many good and accessible reviews.7 
The idea that human cognition is based on two basic processes—one automatic and 
largely unconscious, one slow and largely conscious—is now uncontroversial in 
neuroscience and psychology (Chaiken and Trope 1999; Greene et al. 2004; Schwarz 
1998; Wilson 2002). As I will argue below, understanding the different ways these 
processes operate is key to understanding the role of beliefs in sociological models of 
human behavior. 
Based on this work in dual-process theory, social psychologist Jonathan Haidt 
(2001, 2005) offers a useful metaphor for summarizing this “divided self”: a rider on the 
back of an elephant. The rider, which represents our conscious processes, is the part of 
ourselves we know best—she can talk, reason, and explain things to our heart’s content. 
Yet, for the most part, she is not in charge. The elephant, which stands for our automatic 
processes, is larger and stronger than the rider, and is totally unencumbered by the need, 
or the ability, to justify itself. Driven by the simple mechanism of attraction and repulsion 
(what Haidt colloquially calls the “like-o-meter”), the elephant goes where it wants. As 
the metaphor implies, the rider is no match for the elephant in a direct struggle. While the 
rider usually only pretends to be in control, she can slowly train the elephant over time, 
or perhaps trick it into going a different way. But in any given moment, the elephant—
                                                 
7
 One popular treatment of this literature that may be familiar to many sociologists is Blink, by Malcolm 
Gladwell (2005). 
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practical consciousness—is usually in charge. For the most part, this is a tremendously 
advantageous thing. Having a durable practical consciousness means that rather than 
having to weigh the pros and cons of our beliefs and routines on a daily basis (e.g., 
“Well, should I go to work again today?”) we can leave some things up to cumulated 
habits. Having to consciously reevaluate one’s political leanings, religious commitments, 
hygienic habits, and life goals on a daily basis would be cognitively overwhelming. 
Though the rider/elephant metaphor may be intuitively attractive to some, it is 
important to note that it is not simply a metaphor but a heuristic encapsulation of decades 
of neurological and psychological research (Chaiken and Trope 1999; Wilson 2002). It is 
also imperative to point out that reliance on neuroscience and psychology to develop a 
more realistic model of human cognition is by no means reductionistic. Rather, 
acknowledging “the elephant” provides a validated mechanism for understanding an 
important way in which society can “get into” human beings that is homologous with 
Giddens’s practical consciousness and Bourdieu’s habitus.8 These insights can remove 
some of the sting of “black box” critiques that have been leveled against the habitus (e.g., 
Boudon 1998).  
 
Toward a Synthesis 
While neuroscience and psychology are essential for understanding the form or 
process of the divided self, sociology is particularly suited to understanding its 
substantive content. What makes up the elephant? What kinds of things does it like or 
dislike? Psychologists are good at specifying general characteristics of the elephant, such 
                                                 
8
 Because the focus here is on action rather than on socialization, this paper is more concerned with the 
effects of particular forms of practical consciousness than with their origins. Future research will consider 
the social sources of different forms of practical consciousness. 
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as the seemingly universal tendency toward reciprocity. But there is much more to social 
cognition than human universals. Might not some of the elephant’s tendencies be socially 
pattered, differing systematically across “cognitive subcultures” (Zerubavel 1997)? 
Bourdieu’s research into aesthetic judgment offers an obvious “yes” to this question, but 
there is no need to believe a priori that the habitus is limited to evaluating tastes or even 
discriminating among other class-linked goods. Developing a more thorough 
understanding of the “elephant” – habitus, or practical consciousness – may help us 
answer the question motivating this paper: what is the role of cultural and moral beliefs in 
people’s behavior? 
A substantial amount of evidence supports the assertion that not only consciously 
stated values and beliefs but also moral intuitions—the unreflective likes and dislikes of 
practical consciousness—vary between cultures. Cultural psychologist and anthropologist 
Richard Shweder and colleagues have outlined a cross-culturally validated typology of 
three major ethics: the ethic of autonomy, concerned with harm, rights, and justice; the 
ethic of community, concerned with role obligations; and the ethic of divinity, concerned 
with maintaining purity and not violating the “natural” order (Shweder 2003). This three 
part typology is remarkably similar to the individualist, community-centered, and 
religious typology that Bellah offers.9 Though Shweder himself talks about these three 
ethics mainly in terms of “discourse,” psychological research has associated them with 
varied emotions and intuitions about right and wrong in natural and experimental settings 
(Haidt 2001; Rozin, Lowery, Imada and Haidt 1999; Wheatley and Haidt 2005). These 
studies have shown important differences in moral intuitions between (for example) 
                                                 
9
 Close parallels can also be found with Triandis’s vertical/horizontal and individualist/collectivist typology 
(Triandis 1995; Oishi et al. 1998) and Mary Douglas’s group/grid typology (Douglas and Ney 1998). 
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India, Brazil, and the United States, but also between political liberals and conservatives 
in the United States. Culture shapes emotions and intuitions as well as acceptable forms 
of talk (compare Scott and Lyman 1968). 
These findings can easily be translated in sociologically useful ways. There is also 
a growing acknowledgement that (despite Bourdieu’s assertion) the habitus can serve as a 
general theoretical tool apart from its relationship to stratifying forms of capital.10 For 
instance, Raymond Lau (2004) and Andrew Sayer (2005) have argued that the habitus 
should best be thought of as produced by many kinds of experience—class-based, family-
based, and so on. Sayer in particular contends that moral concerns are central to a 
complete understanding of habitus. After all, if a working class person can internalize 
from experience that classical music is “not for the likes of us,” couldn’t (say) some 
evangelical Protestants internalize the notion that pornography is “not for the likes of us” 
and turn away from it in disgust, no matter what arguments are offered to justify it? In 
essence, Sayer revives parts of the classical notion of habitus that Bourdieu ignored, and 
invites us to extend the logic of Bourdieu’s theory from “good music” or “good art” to 
“the good” more generally. 
Cognitive anthropologists Claudia Strauss and Naomi Quinn (1997) make a 
similar argument, explicitly likening Bourdieu’s habitus to the unconscious schemas that 
people develop through life experience. Strauss and Quinn’s argument is particularly 
important for sociologists of culture because their use of the “schema” concept is 
significantly different than that typically employed by sociologists of culture (compare 
DiMaggio 1997). While there is indeed evidence that people file away bits and pieces of 
                                                 
10
 Michèle Lamont (1992) has similarly argued that Bourdieu overemphasizes “capitals” at the expense of 
morality, but grounded her multivalent scheme in conscious “repertoires of evaluation” rather than in an 
internalized habitus. 
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culture and draw on them strategically (say, to win an argument), cognitive 
anthropologists have also come to the conclusion that some cultural schemas are more 
internalized than others. Far from rejecting the notion of internalized beliefs and values, 
D’Andrade discusses how “the beliefs and values of a culture may be internalized” 
through “secondary appraisals [i.e., cultural talk] and the cultural shaping of emotion” (p. 
227). D’Andrade outlines four levels of internalization, from simple acquisition, to the 
“cliché stage,” to belief, to belief with high salience. He contends that while the lower 
stages of internalization (on which DiMaggio 1997 focuses) concern classification, 
cultural knowledge, and social reasoning, the final stage becomes truly motivational: 
“this cultural shaping of emotions gives certain cultural representations emotional force, 
in that individuals experience the truth and rightness of certain ideas as emotions within 
themselves” (p. 229). He then spends the next fourteen pages discussing precisely how 
cultural representations can serve as motives for action in some persons and groups. In 
sum, while arguing contra earlier anthropologists (e.g., Geertz 1973) that cultural 
schemas are not perfectly shared or perfectly internalized by all members of a given 
society, cognitive anthropology has certainly not rejected the idea of “culture as values 
that suffuse other aspects of belief, intention, and collective life [in favor of one that sees] 
culture as complex, rule-like structures that can be put to strategic use” (DiMaggio 1997, 
p. 264-5). 
Consistent with this logic, Strauss and Quinn (1997) do not talk of schemas as 
things that are “deployed” like cultural tools, but rather as deep, largely unconscious 
knowledge structures that facilitate perception and interpretation. Their use of the word 
“schema” is much more like Zerubavel’s (1997) notion of “social mindscape” than like a 
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cultural tool. Indeed, one might argue, as do Strauss and Quinn, that schemas serve as the 
building blocks of the habitus, disposing us to interpret present events in light of past 
experience. This view is eminently compatible with Bourdieu’s own definition of habitus: 
“systems of durable transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to 
function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize 
practices and representations ... without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an 
express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them” (Bourdieu 1990, p. 52; 
emphasis added). Unlike Bourdieu, but similar to Lau and Sayer, Strauss and Quinn do 
not privilege the “structuring power” of different forms of capital, but rather proceed 
inductively and empirically to discover experiences that may have formed the schemas of 
their informants. 
The model that emerges from combining practice theories with recent work in 
neuroscience and psychology is relatively straightforward, but differs significantly from 
the one most empirical researchers bring to bear (explicitly or implicitly) when studying 
cultural beliefs. What is offered here is a dual-process model of cultural cognition: actors 
are driven primarily by deeply internalized automatic processes (the “elephant”/practical 
consciousness/habitus) yet also capable of deliberation (the “rider”/discursive 
consciousness). This simple model is a potentially powerful theoretical heuristic. For the 
purposes of examining the importance of cultural beliefs for behavior, this model also 
opens up space for considering how beliefs and worldviews might operate through 
automatic cognition. In the next section, I outline some of the practical implications of 
the basic dual-process model. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
Taking the existence of the elephant seriously and combining it with insights from 
sociology and related disciplines does not take us all the way toward a complete theory of 
how values, culture, and morality matter in shaping people’s behavior. Yet it does two 
important things. First, it tempers our excitement about the evidence that has been offered 
for the justificatory, toolkit, or repertoire perspective. As I argued above, the evidence 
repertoire theorists provide for this view rests on a highly questionable implicit premise 
(albeit one with a distinguished pedigree)—that beliefs, worldviews, and morality would 
have to operate through conscious thought to be causally efficacious. In the language of 
Haidt’s metaphor, Swidler’s discussions, for example, are with the rider alone. This 
empirical method cannot rule out the possibility that deeply internalized moral attractions 
and repulsions (grounded in automatic processes) are patterned in motivationally 
important ways. The foregoing argument suggests that some of her respondents would be 
less likely to divorce than others—even if their friends were divorcing—because of 
internalized habits of moral judgment they cannot, themselves, articulate clearly. 
However, since Swidler does not treat culture as a predictor but rather as an outcome, we 
cannot know whether the “culture talk” her respondents rely on is correlated with 
different types of marital outcomes.11 Thus, we must look for additional evidence to 
bolster or question her conclusions about the ways culture matters. 
The second implication of the model is that methods matter, and that they matter 
in a very specific way. The unstructured or semi-structured interview puts us in direct 
contact with the rider, but probably gives us little leverage on the elephant. The rider is 
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 Lamont and colleagues (1996) also treat cultural-moral boundaries as products of social location rather 
than as predictors of behavior. 
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incredibly good at offering reasons, which may not be at all related to the real motives 
behind a person’s behavior. For instance, in split brain studies, experimenters have 
directly exploited this discursive/ automatic divide by flashing different pictures to 
different sides of a participant’s field of vision (and therefore to different sides of the 
brain). In Gazzaniga’s celebrated study (quoted in [Haidt 2005]), a picture of a chicken 
claw was flashed to the side of the brain which specializes in language while a picture of 
a house covered with snow was simultaneously flashed to the other side. When asked to 
select from a card the picture that goes best with what he or she had seen, the patient’s 
right hand pointed to a chicken and the left hand pointed to a shovel. When the 
experimenter asked for an explanation of these choices, the patient inevitably said 
something like, “You need a shovel to clean out the chicken coop,” completely unaware 
that the choice of the shovel was motivated by having seen a snow-covered scene. As 
Swidler (2001) and others have correctly noted, we are very good at providing 
justifications for our behavior, even when they have little to do with our true motivations. 
While these studies prove nothing per se for sociologists, this line of reasoning 
suggests an unorthodox methodological possibility: interviews may not be the best way to 
understand how people make most judgments. Carefully constructed and implemented, 
surveys may be better suited to the study of the culture-action link. (Experiments, though 
powerful tests of specific formal processes, seem less well-suited for exploring the 
culture-action link in everyday life.) Indeed, in a domain more closely related to 
sociology, moral psychological research comparing the Moral Judgment Interview, an 
open ended instrument, and the Defining Issues Test, a fixed-response survey, suggests 
that the fixed response format yields better estimates of people’s actual moral decision 
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processes (Narvaez and Bock 2002). This is because—consistent with a dual-process 
model of discursive and practical consciousness—most of the knowledge we bring to 
bear in everyday life is tacit and schematic rather than explicit and deliberative.  
Again, neuroscientific research points in a similar direction. In other studies of 
patients whose corpus callosa had been severed, researchers flashed pictures of objects to 
different sides of a patient’s field of vision. When a picture of a shape was flashed to the 
side corresponding to the brain’s language center, the patient was able to report that he 
had seen that shape. Conversely, when the same picture was flashed to the other side of 
the field of vision, the patient was unable to report this verbally. Yet, when asked to 
select from a list of shapes, he could select the correct one (Gazzaniga 1987). Thus, just 
as a six year old is very good as recognizing incorrect grammar (e.g., she knows that “he 
are” is incorrect) while remaining unable to explain why it is incorrect, we seem better 
able to recognize our tacit beliefs than to explain them to an interlocutor. This is entirely 
consistent with Giddens’s view of practical consciousness. 
Let me summarize the methodological implications of this model by analogy. If 
talking about our mental processes with an interviewer is like describing a criminal 
suspect to a sketch artist, then answering survey questions is like picking a suspect out of 
a line up. The latter is simply much less cognitively demanding and more accurate, 
provided the right answers are in the survey “line up.” Getting the right line up is, of 
course, the function of good theory. Again, this is not an argument from metaphor, but a 
metaphoric illustration of an argument based on extensive empirical evidence that is 
eminently compatible with sociological practice theories. Well-designed survey questions 
may measure practical knowledge better because they present the respondent with 
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situations that are homologous to the quasi-aesthetic processes of judgment at work in 
daily life. When we hear a survey question, we simply have to pick the response our 
practical consciousness prefers; the response that seems right to us (and for us). 
Similarly, all of Bourdieu’s respondents in Distinction surely thought they listened to 
“good music,” yet their responses were patterned in sociologically interpretable ways. In 
the same way, we may be able to rely on respondents’ choice from a fixed list of moral 
schemas to predict their morally-relevant behavior. The following section illustrates this 
possibility empirically. 
 
AN EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION OF THE MODEL 
If the dual-process, rider-on-an-elephant, model of moral culture outlined above is 
indeed correct, it suggests two empirical propositions:  
 
PROPOSITION 1: Because discursive consciousness is largely uninvolved in routine moral 
decision-making, interview respondents will tend to be incoherent and self-contradictory 
in explaining how they make moral decisions; 
 
PROPOSITION 2: Because the practical consciousness (or moral habitus) knows which 
survey responses it prefers (even if it can’t explain why), respondents’ choice of moral 
schema in surveys will be predictive of their future morally-relevant behavior. 
 
It should be noted here that only the dual-process model of culture can integrate 
both of these propositions into its logic. The classical means-ends or “voluntarist” view 
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would be most consistent with the data if interviews and surveys yielded similar strong 
associations between moral beliefs and behavior. The toolkit or repertoire view, on the 
other hand, would assume that neither interviews nor surveys would be causally 
connected to important outcomes once social networks and institutional locations are 
accounted for. 
 
Data and Analytic Strategy 
The data I will use to illustrate the model come from in-depth interviews and a 
two-wave telephone survey included in the National Study of Youth and Religion, a 
large, multiyear, multimethod investigation in which I was directly involved. The 
telephone survey began in 2002 and obtained completed surveys from 3,290 respondents, 
ages 13-18. The Wave 2 survey in 2005 contacted around 79 percent of these 
respondents, then aged 15-20. I personally conducted around 35 in-depth interviews with 
respondents over a period of over two years. I also have read through the 264 interview 
transcripts from the first wave and the 122 from the second wave. In addition, the 
researchers who were involved in the Wave 1 and Wave 2 interviewing spent a week 
together (after each wave) talking about general patterns and striving for consensus on 
major themes. For more information on the general study design, see Smith and Denton 
(2005) and youthandreligion.org. 
While Proposition 2 can be shown to be accurate here in a statistical sense, 
Proposition 1 is not susceptible to quick demonstration. Because “tending to incoherence 
and self-contradiction” are evaluations arrived at over time and by reading (and 
conducting) hundreds of interviews, I cannot offer a simple, compelling illustration. 
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Furthermore, this proposition has already been amply demonstrated by other research on 
moral beliefs and decision-making (Bellah et. al [1985] 1996; Swidler 2001). Instead, I 
will offer quotations from interviews that illustrate rather than “prove” the overall pattern 
that I and the other interviewers noted in the NSYR. This pattern is consistent with that 
already noted in the literature. 
To provide the best possible illustration of the model, I examine semi-structured 
discussions and survey questions related to two behavioral and network outcomes—
smoking marijuana, volunteering, and having friends that engage in both these practices. 
These two outcomes represent both proscriptive and prescriptive elements of moral 
judgment (Joas 2000). Smoking marijuana is “deviant” behavior that is generally 
discouraged by society, while volunteering is a prosocial behavior that is generally 
encouraged. To measure marijuana use, I use a survey question that asked: “How often, if 
ever, do you use marijuana?” and has 7 response categories from “never” to “once a day 
or more.” For the measure of marijuana use, the Wave 1 response categories were 
somewhat different, with four possible responses ranging from never to “use it regularly.” 
To measure volunteering, I use a question that asked, “In the last year, how much, if at 
all, have you done organized volunteer work or community service?” The response 
categories are “never,” “a few times,” “occasionally,” and “regularly.” 
I use a single variable to measure the moral schema that resonates best with each 
respondent. Consistent with previous research on moral judgment (Hunter 2000), I rely 
on a question designed to mirror the moral typology developed in Habits of the Heart 
(Bellah et al. [1985] 1996). This typology includes expressive individualism and 
utilitarian individualism as well as the “relational” (community-centered) and theistic 
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moralities covered in Habits. To get at which one of these moral schemas resonates best 
with a person’s moral habitus, the survey asks, “If you were unsure of what was right or 
wrong in a particular situation, how would you decide what to do? Would you… 1) Do 
what would make you feel happy (expressive individualist [chosen by 26 percent]), 2) Do 
what would help you to get ahead (utilitarian individualist [11 percent]), 3) Follow the 
advice of a teacher, parent, or other adult you respect (relational [42 percent]), or 4) Do 
what you think God or scripture tells you is right (theistic [21 percent])?”12 A single item 
measure is of course not ideal, and as a measure of moral judgment, this question is 
certainly not exhaustive of the possibilities. For example it doesn’t allow for certain 
answers that we might expect in this population (e.g., “do what my friends would do”). 
Nevertheless, as a single item it is well-matched to the Bellah typology and was explicitly 
designed to measure these moral schemas in the teenage and young adult population. 
To illustrate Proposition 2, I estimate ordered logistic regression models 
predicting behavior at Wave 2 using the lagged dependent variables and other predictors 
from Wave 1 (Halaby 2004). (See the Appendix 1 for details on all variables, including 
descriptive statistics.) The objective is to isolate the effect of the moral habitus at Wave 1 
on changes in the outcome at Wave 2, net of other confounding factors at Wave 1. The 
two-and-a-half year lag between waves may be longer than ideal, but since we are 
interested in durable moral dispositions, a lag of this length should not pose a significant 
problem. In estimating the effect of moral schemas, the expressive individualist schema 
(“do what makes me feel happy”) is treated as the reference category. Because the goal is 
not to estimate the effects of a change in moral habitus on a change in behavior, but 
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 This question was based on the one developed by Hunter (2000), but it was significantly modified by 
Christian Smith for use in the National Study of Youth and Religion. 
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instead the effects of a prior state of the moral habitus on future behavior, I use a lagged 
dependent variable model rather than a fixed-effects specification (Haynie and Osgood 
2005).  
Since marijuana use represents “deviance,” we should find that the more 
traditional relational and theistic schemas are negatively associated with this outcome. On 
the other hand, since both community and religious moralities are “collectivist” (Hitlin 
2003; Oishi et al. 1998; Triandis 1995) we should expect that they will be positively 
associated with community volunteering. In addition to the usual demographic controls, 
several other factors are included to attempt to rule out potential spurious associations. To 
exclude the possibility that adult network connections (rather than practical 
consciousness itself) are driving the community moral schema response, I control for 
closeness to parents and adult network closure around the respondent. To rule out the 
possibility that religious networks or institutions are driving the theistic response, I 
control for religious attendance, religious tradition, and the number of close friends who 
share the respondent’s religious beliefs. Altogether, the sociodemographic and network 
controls should account for the institutional and interactional context that is usually held 
to motivate or constrain behavior (Lichterman 1996; Mills 1940; Swidler 2001; see also 
Campbell 1996). Before turning to these models, however, I illustrate Proposition 1 using 
data from the NSYR. 
 
Assessing Discursive Moral Consciousness 
Teenagers are not widely considered to be the most articulate group. Yet the 
interviews I and others conducted for the National Study of Youth and Religion 
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demonstrated that this inarticulacy is strongly pattered by domain. Many teenagers, for 
instance, are extremely articulate about sexually transmitted diseases, the groups at their 
school, and other topics that are highly salient to teen life and/or are frequently discussed 
in school settings (particularly in health class) (Smith and Denton 2005). These patterns 
suggest that there is no developmental “upper bound” on articulacy for teenage subjects. 
We found, however, that these same teenagers were generally highly inarticulate about 
how they make moral decisions. In our semi-structured interview format, we asked a very 
similar question about moral judgment to that posed in the survey. First, we asked, “Has 
there ever been a situation in your life where you were unsure what was right and 
wrong?” In most cases, the adolescent was able to think of and describe a situation. We 
then asked, “How did you decide what to do?” Later on in the interview, we also asked a 
more general question, “How do you generally decide what is right or wrong, good or 
bad, in life?” By eliciting both specific and general descriptions of decision making, we 
hoped to get good information on the ways in which American youth make moral 
decisions. In the vast majority of cases, however, they had tremendous difficulty 
articulating their mental processes for us. 
When adolescents did offer explanations for their moral decision-making 
processes, their responses generally fell into one of two classes. The first generally 
treated moral knowledge as self-evident. That is, those who responded in this way “just 
knew” that certain activities or relationships were morally suspect. 
 
I: Has there ever been a time when you were unsure of what was 
right and wrong in a particular situation?  
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  R:  Yes. [...] 
  I:  Okay, how do you decide, how did you decide what to do?  
  R:  Mm, just with what felt better. 
  I:  Okay what, what do you mean by that? 
  R:  Just a gut instinct, I guess. 
  (17-year-old girl, emphasis added) 
 
In many respects, this general group of interviews gave impressions similar to 
Brian Palmer in Habits of the Heart, who says: “Why is integrity important and lying 
bad? I don’t know. It just is. It’s just so basic. I don’t want to be bothered with 
challenging that. It’s part of me. I don’t know where it came from, but it’s very 
important.” Here is another excerpt from a similar interview I conducted. 
 
I: Okay. How do you generally decide what to do when you’re 
unsure of what’s right and wrong? 
R: Um, I, I don’t, um, really know. I, I, I, just um, I just um, kind of 
instinctively know usually. Just sort of feel it. 
(17-year-old boy) 
 
The language of “doing what feels right” is most often associated with a lack of 
guiding moral principles. Yet both these respondents were highly religious and were not 
engaged in any of the “deviant” practices we asked about in the survey or interview. 
Moreover, when forced by the design of the survey question to identify from fixed 
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responses, each chose “do what God or scripture says is right” as the best way of 
describing their moral decision process. In general, we found little link between the 
rhetorical style invoked and the overall level of either religiosity or “deviant behavior.” 
Nearly all respondents, regardless of their particular behavioral profile or survey choice 
of moral schema, reported relying on intuitive judgment. 
Another group of respondents, however, also insisted on offering reasons for their 
moral commitments. This group of interviewees best reflect Swidler’s claim in Talk of 
Love that individuals “trim their philosophy to fit their action commitments” (148), and 
“resist the implications of their ideas whenever the ideas don’t lead in the direction they 
want” (147). Because of this dynamic, the exchanges with these respondents could be 
quite long. Here is one example, from a different 17-year old girl. 
 
I: Do you think that drinking, or smoking pot or doing drugs is 
morally wrong or not?  
R: Yeah, it is. 
I: What is it that makes it wrong? 
R: Um, the nicotine makes it addicting or the alcohol that makes it so 
you’re out of control and it just causes more problems, both of 
them. 
 
I attempted to get this interviewee to think about the fact that if personal harm 
were really the reason not to engage in these activities, there should be situations where 
using illegal substances is rendered morally irrelevant. 
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I: Okay … let’s say a person was terminally ill and they had a week 
to live or something and they just wanted to smoke some cigarettes 
or something before they die just to see what it was like, you know 
do you think that would be okay or not? 
R: That’s gonna harm them right before they die. [laughs nervously] 
I: I mean, if they’re gonna die anyway … do you think that would 
still be a problem, or no? 
R: Yeah, ‘cause that would be awfully hard on their throat right 
before they’d die, too. 
 
At the end of this particular conversation, the young woman conceded that people 
can “kill themselves if they want to” but it would still be immoral “no matter what.” 
Needless to say, the logic here is painfully strained. The idea that a clear moral principle 
of “do no harm” is at work seems highly dubious. This exchange, and others like it, are 
strongly consonant with the notion that beliefs are post hoc explanations for action with 
another causal source. The majority of the interviews give the strong impression that it is 
indeed the “action commitments” of respondents that matter most (Swidler 2001). Even 
when interviewees were able to see the holes in their arguments (by finally realizing, for 
example, that the principle of “do no harm” is not very persuasive in the case of terminal 
illness) they simply searched for different reasons to support their behavioral habits and 
friendship choices.  
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These excerpts from the NSYR interviews are meant to complement previous 
research that has found inarticulacy regarding the link between beliefs, moral judgment, 
and action consistent with Proposition 1. Considered alone, these illustrations are also 
highly consistent with toolkit or repertoire theory. The qualitative data in general seem to 
rule out the idea that these interviewees engage very often in deliberative moral reasoning 
or that their deliberations could serve as clear guides to action. Indeed, the interviewers 
saw a clear pattern of “repertoires of justification” or cultural toolkits at work.  But 
turning to the survey results, we see that relying solely on discursive accounts to evaluate 
the link between cultural belief and action can be misleading. 
 
Assessing Practical Moral Consciousness 
Table 1.1 shows the results of ordered logistic regression models predicting Wave 
2 volunteering, marijuana use, and network composition. The basic pattern of results is 
clear across models. Net of a host of other network, family, religious, and 
sociodemographic controls, a respondent’s choice of moral schema strongly predicts 
behavior two-and-a-half years later. These results are highly consistent with Proposition 
2. More specifically, and in conjunction with expectations, relational and theistic schemas 
have negative effects on drug use and positive effects on volunteering. These 
relationships are robust even when taking previous behavior and network composition 
into account. 
The moral schema variables are not only statistically significant; they are among 
the most consistent predictors across all models. The theistic moral schema is the only 
variable (other than previous behavior and network composition) that is statistically 
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significant in all four models. The relational moral schema is significant in three of the 
four models. Table 1.2 offers a measure of effect size by presenting the percentage 
change in the odds that the respondent will be in a higher ordinal category of the outcome 
associated with theoretically important predictor variables. For dichotomous variables the 
percentage change in odds is reported for a discrete change in the predictor from 0 to 1. 
For the other variables, the percentage change in odds reflects a one standard deviation 
increase in the predictor. 
Table 1.2 illustrates the net explanatory power of practical moral consciousness. 
In the model predicting marijuana use, prior use has the largest effect (+89.9 percent 
increase in odds). Yet among the other main predictors, both moral schema variables 
have an influence similar to or larger than one-SD change in drug and alcohol using 
networks. In fact, the theistic schema produces an effect equivalent to a two standard 
deviation change in prior network composition. Compared to the expressive 
individualists, the theistic moral schema also has a larger “protective effect” against 
marijuana use than school achievement (GPA) or the “hard structure” of an intact 
biological family. The results for the volunteering model are similar; the lagged 
dependent variable has the largest effect, while the moral schema effects exceed the 
network and family structure effects. In the case of the drug using network model, 
however, the effect of the theistic moral schema is even larger in absolute terms than that 
of a one-SD change in the lagged dependent variable. In the volunteering networks 
model, both moral schema variables produce changes in the odds of being in a higher 
response category by more than a one-SD change in prior network composition. Given 
the attention that is typically paid to the power of networks to shape behavior, these are 
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strong effects. We can therefore safely conclude from these analyses that the moral 
schema variables are not only statistically significant but substantively significant as well. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The empirical exercises above were meant to illustrate rather than prove the utility 
of a dual process model of culture in action. Let us step back for a moment and consider 
what the results imply. First, the NSYR interviews show—consistent with previous 
research—that most interviewees claim to know the difference between right and wrong 
in an intuitive way, yet are largely incapable of articulating their moral decision-making 
processes. Many young people who do attempt to articulate their moral reasoning 
maintain their “action commitments” even when the evidence they offer is painfully 
insufficient or even self-contradictory. Second, despite this inarticulacy, the survey 
analysis shows strong effects of moral schema choice on behaviors nearly three years 
later. This finding is remarkable—a single, very general question about moral judgment, 
asked in a few seconds over the phone, is a better net predictor of deviance nearly three 
years later than income, education, peer networks, family structure, or religiosity. How 
can these results be best understood? 
Neither qualitative nor quantitative analyses of a single case can establish the 
adequacy of a particular theoretical model. They can, however, offer evidence that is 
more or less consistent with competing explanations and shift the parameters of 
plausibility. In this case, the combined finding of discursive inarticulacy with strong 
moral schema effects makes the dual-process model of culture seem a more satisfactory 
explanation than the available alternatives. If moral cultural beliefs were consistently 
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articulated and demonstrated to be causally efficacious, we might want to return to the 
days of the “voluntarist theory of action.” Yet our results show that Mills, Scott and 
Lyman, Swidler and others are right on in their assessment of how people use cultural 
evaluations—to justify their action commitments. The interview data illustrate this 
process at work, casting doubt on the adequacy of the Parsonian model of culture-as-
ends. Combined with survey data, however, we see that the toolkit-repertoire approach 
itself has a major flaw. It cannot incorporate the findings of the survey analysis in its own 
theoretical logic. There appears to be an effect of moral cultural beliefs above and beyond 
the institutional and interactional context surrounding the actor. Of the three theories 
discussed in this paper—Parsonian, toolkit-repertoire, and dual-process—only the latter 
can account for the mixed-method results without introducing concepts foreign to its own 
logic. 
In a research community increasingly interested in understanding mechanisms 
rather than documenting associations, the dual-process model also provides a more 
satisfying and empirically justifiable account of the way that culturally-influenced “social 
mindscapes” are related to action (Archer 1996). Without the insights of this model, we 
might have told one of two kinds of common, but probably unrealistic stories about the 
relationship between teenagers’ beliefs and actions: either that they have different moral 
beliefs that they use as “moral compasses” to make decisions (Hunter 2000; Smith 2003); 
or that they deploy the different moral repertoires they have learned to make sense of 
their decisions to others (Mills 1940; Scott and Lyman 1968; Swidler 2001). As we have 
seen, in this particular case at least, neither of these stories can make sense of all the data. 
Understanding the possible disconnect between discursive and practical consciousness, 
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however, enables a more realistic interpretation of the findings: American teenagers are 
profoundly influenced by cultural forces in ways that they are largely unaware of and 
unable to articulate. The case I have used here is merely an illustration, however. Though 
it indeed appears promising, future research is needed to confirm, refine, and expand on 
the basic model. 
The dual process model of culture outlined and illustrated here is not only useful 
for resolving arcane debates in a specific subfield; it also has implications for the most 
theoretically disinterested sociological researcher. While many sociologists talk as if the 
survey is simply a necessary evil, a mass-scale substitute for the deep insight of an 
interview, these results suggest that fixed-response surveys play a vital role in inquiry 
about the role of beliefs in action. It appears that the vast majority of individuals, living 
as they do in a world that is not continuously narrated in theoretical terms, rely on 
practical consciousness for most of their decisions (Giddens 1984). Thus they may be 
much better able to pick themselves out of the proverbial line up than to describe 
themselves to a sociological sketch artist.13  
On the other hand, far from being a nice bonus, or adding a certain richness to 
quantitative inquiry, interviews may be a vital component of theory testing, particularly 
in the sociologies of culture and religion. Interviews are also necessary for understanding 
how people “make sense” of the world to each other and to themselves in the face of an 
inquisitive questioner (Scott and Lyman 1968). But one methodological strategy is not 
appropriate for answering all questions. In particular, there are strong reasons to question 
the validity of interview methods as a sufficient window into the culture-action link. The 
                                                 
13
 Laboratory research in psychology has found parallel differences in the results of studies that “access” 
discursive versus practical consciousness (Wilson 2002). 
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insights yielded here into the mechanisms of moral decision making simply could not 
have been found with one method alone. Future research ought to compare the results of 
ethnographies, focus groups, interviews, and surveys—ideally of the same subjects—in 
order to see how different methods encourage reliance on different forms of cognitive 
processing. Future research should also explore the types of actor-situation profiles that 
render certain forms of processing more relevant for predicting action. It remains to be 
seen, for example, which actor-situation combinations render deliberative thought more 
or less consequential for generating observed behavior. In addition, although the vast 
majority of NSYR respondents, like the middle-class adults in Habits of the Heart, had 
difficulty discussing the link between their beliefs and behaviors, this articulacy is 
probably not randomly distributed. Future research should also examine individual-level 
variability in discursive articulacy with an eye toward its potential social consequences.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has been an attempt at making a theoretical contribution and 
illustrating the usefulness of this contribution through an empirical illustration. My 
argument had four main parts. First, I traced the development of the 
motivation/justification split in the sociology of culture and religion, and unearthed a 
questionable premise underlying both. Second, I drew on sociological practice theories, 
augmented and validated by research in psychology and neuroscience, to offer a simple 
synthesis of the motivation/justification approaches—a dual-process model of cultural 
cognition. Third, I provided a mixed-method illustration that showed how the dual-
process model can make sense of the data than either its “Parsonian” or toolkit-repertoire 
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theory competitors. Fourth, I discussed some implications of these findings for research 
in the sociology of culture and the sociology of religion. 
Lest I be misunderstood, let me clarify what I have not done. First, I have not 
attempted to turn the sociology of culture on its head. My goal is simply to offer a 
heuristic model of culture in action that improves upon both the voluntarist theory of 
action and the toolkit while preserving the strengths of both. Second, I have not offered 
radically new or different insights into the nature of human life. The notion of the 
“elephant”—a non-discursive, practical side of the person—is borrowed from 
contemporary social psychology (Haidt 2005; Wilson 2002) and can be traced back to 
Freud or even further back to Aristotle and the scholastics. The idea that we internalize 
principles of moral judgment through practice is straight out of the Nichomachean Ethics 
(Casebeer and Churchland 2003). Furthermore, there are already sociological approaches 
(outside of the sociology of culture) that point in a broadly similar direction. Affect 
control theory (Smith-Lovin 1995) takes seriously the role of unconscious evaluations 
and the sociology of emotions more generally (e.g., Thoits 1989) invites us to look 
beyond “discourse” to causally efficacious internal states. While I have focused here on 
the broadly shared ideas of dual process theory, sociologists who study culture, religion, 
and cognition can look for specific inspiration both inside and outside of the discipline. 
Thus, rather than offer anything new, my objective has been to bridge a gap 
between work in the sociology of culture and religion on the one hand, and highly 
relevant work in cognitive science on the other. Because of the academic division of 
labor, psychologists have developed much better models of the forms of human cognition 
than sociologists have. Yet our strength is in articulating and investigating how socially 
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patterned cultural contents interact with that form to produce observable human conduct 
(Zerubavel 1997). One of the goals of this paper is thus to encourage a fruitful cross-
disciplinary dialogue in the domain of moral-cultural judgment. This is not an attempt at 
synthesis for the sake of synthesis. The argument here is that by relying on sociological 
theories that emphasize a single mode of processing, we necessarily leave out a sizeable 
chunk of human life, not to mention foregoing explanatory power (Hechter et al. 1999). 
Achieving greater cognitive verisimilitude will allow sociologists to explain social life in 
a more satisfactory fashion both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
I argue that taking the difference between discursive and practical consciousness 
seriously will help move toward a more realistic view of the role of beliefs in human 
behavior. As Swidler acknowledges in the introduction to Talk of Love, culture can “use 
us” as much as we can use it, yet repertoire theory is poorly equipped for dealing with 
that important aspect of “how culture matters.” Although the dual-process model is not a 
complete “theory of culture,” and is not presented as such, it offers a simple framework 
that is capable of generating and testing a host of research questions in a systematic way. 
It has clear constituent concepts (discursive and practical consciousness) and relies on 
models of human cognitive processing that have been cross-validated with research in 
psychology and neuroscience. The sociological study of culture is a growing enterprise, 
and its metaphors matter. Perhaps a simple change from “toolkit” to “rider on an 
elephant” would in fact constitute theoretical progress. 
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Table 1.1. Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Wave 2 Behavior 
 (1)  (2) 
 Marijuana  Volunteering 
Moral Schemas      
Expressive (reference) --   --  
Utilitarian -.387   .098  
Relational -.308 *  .168  
Theistic -.911 ***  .344 * 
Previous Behaviors      
Smoking Pot .883 ***  --  
Volunteering --   .427 *** 
Peer Networks      
# Use Drugs/Drink a Lot .184 ***  --  
# Volunteer Regularly --   .076 * 
# Similar Religious Beliefs .027   .057 * 
Family, Community, Religion      
Parent Closeness .012   .085  
Network Closure .022   .092 * 
Church Attendance -.029   .020  
Evangelical Protestant -.059   -.354  
Mainline Protestant .040   -.063  
Black Protestant .344   -.300  
Catholic .131   -.182  
Jewish -.758   -.022  
Mormon -.653   .625  
Other Religion -.211   .070  
Indeterminate Religion .258   -.849 * 
Not Religious (reference) --   --  
Other Factors      
Female  -.120   .128  
Age -.082   -.121 *** 
Black -.456   -.247  
Other race -.448 *  .164  
South -.257   -.023  
Midwest -.124   -.076  
West .061   -.056  
GPA -.330 **  .270 *** 
Number of Friends .026   -.085  
Parent Income .036   .024  
Parent Education .048   .086 *** 
Two-Parent Bio. Family -.358 *  .040  
N 2209   2223  
Log-likelihood -1881.2   -2763.3  
Cragg and Uhler's R² .216   .192  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (two-tailed) 
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Table 1.2. Percent Changes in Odds at Wave 2 Associated with Changes in Selected 
Variables  
  
 
 Marijuana Use Volunteering 
Wave 1 Relational Schema -26.5 ns 
Wave 1 Theistic Schema -59.8 41.0 
Wave 1 Marijuana Use ‡ 89.9 -- 
Wave 1 Volunteering ‡ -- 53.8 
Wave 1 Drug Using Networks ‡ 26.3 -- 
Wave 1 Volunteering Networks ‡ -- 12.0 
Wave 1 GPA ‡ -20.3 20.4 
Wave 1 Two-Parent Biological Family -30.1 ns 
 
NOTE: ‡ = the change in the odds associated with a one-SD change in the predictor. For the other 
variables, the change in odds is for a discrete change from 0 to 1. 
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CHAPTER 2: MORAL CULTURES AND NETWORK COMPOSITION 
Sociology is a highly fractured discipline, containing simultaneously a number of 
theories and perspectives that are contradictory or even incommensurable. In recent 
years, however, one theoretical viewpoint—network theory—has attained a high degree 
of acceptance discipline-wide, from social movements to comparative-historical to social 
psychology to cultural sociology. If 21st century American sociology shares any 
substantively meaningful common ground it is that “networks matter.” Of course, 
different scholars and different subfields vary in the importance they accord to social 
networks. But in practice this variation in importance occurs on a scale from “very” to 
“total.” Either the substantive content or the geometric structure of networks are held to 
influence, if not cause, everything from religious conversion (Lofland and Stark 1965), to 
finding a job (Granovetter 1995), to personal identity (McFarland and Pals 2005), to 
mercantile dominance of Florence in the early 15th century (Padgett and Ansell 1993). 
Networks are everywhere. 
As other scholars have pointed out, network theory has many obvious attractions 
(see Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). It provides a largely observable mechanism 
(interactions between real people), the proffered mechanism is truly social (not grounded 
in personality or idiosyncratic preferences), and the formal nature of network 
explanations makes them generalizable across substantive areas. Concepts like centrality, 
closure, brokerage, and density are useable in widely diverse substantive inquiries. 
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Though network theory is not without problems or complications, these factors, among 
others, help explain the appeal of network theory across the discipline. 
The goal of this paper is certainly not to dismiss the causal importance of 
networks. There is ample reason to believe that both the shape and content of social 
relations have a profound effect on their members. Instead, the goal of this paper is to 
problematize the formation of social networks from a cultural perspective. In practice, 
most analyses treat networks as exogenous to explanation. That is, most research that 
relies on network explanation assumes that networks simply are and that they cause other 
things to happen.1 For example, Martin (2002) assumes that the leadership and power 
structures in communal groups lead to increased ideological consistency. The possibility 
that groups with highly articulated ideologies might be more willing to accept—or 
survive—strong leadership and hierarchy is not actively considered. 
The assumption that networks are a dominant causal force is especially puzzling 
in the sociology of culture. Making beliefs, ideas, and identities the product of networks 
or other social structures unnecessarily limits the role of culture to an outcome 
(dependent variable) rather than considering it as a possible cause (independent variable) 
(Alexander 2003). In one recent exception to the rule, Lizardo (2006) argues that 
different forms of cultural consumption actually lead to different network structures 
rather than vice versa. This usually unconsidered possibility therefore leads to new 
sociological knowledge. Though Lizardo’s use of instrumental variables provides some 
degree of confidence that the effects he finds in cross-sectional data are indeed causal, 
                                                 
1
 One notable exception to this is the “homophily principle,” which is an attempt to explain all network 
formation with recourse to a single idea—like attracts like (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). 
Although promising, there is plenty of room for investigating other sources of network formation. 
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only longitudinal network data will allow a more rigorous and precise modeling of the 
interplay between culture and networks.  
In this paper, therefore, I use two waves of data from the National Study of Youth 
and Religion to examine predictors of changes in ego network characteristics over a 
three-year period among a sample of more than 2000 U.S. adolescents. Specifically, I 
examine predictors of changes in the number of respondents’ strong ties who use 
controlled substances and who volunteer in the community. I choose these particular 
network characteristics because much research has focused on the importance of peer 
networks in promoting both controlled substance use (Akers et al. 1979) and volunteering 
behaviors (McAdam 1986). I find strong evidence that core moral-cultural beliefs play a 
decisive role in shaping future network formation, net of previous network composition 
and other structural controls. I discuss the implications of these findings for cultural 
sociology and network theory. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Since there are many extant reviews of the network literature (e.g., Wasserman 
and Faust 1994; Watts 2004), there is no need to provide such a review here. Instead, I 
focus on the more delimited discussion about the relationship between networks and 
culture.  
Over a decade ago, Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994; hereafter E&G) offered one 
of the first culturally-informed critiques of network analysis. The authors distinguished 
between three implicit network-theoretic models. The first, structuralist determinism, 
views networks as “infrastructural” (in the Marxian sense) and as straightforwardly 
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giving rise to “softer,” more cultural phenomena. E&G criticize this view because it 
neglects the role of human agency in social life. The next model, structuralist 
instrumentalism, adds the notion of interest-seeking to network structures. Though 
E&G’s writing preceded the recent explosion of economic sociology, much of the 
network-related research in that area relies, implicitly or explicitly, on structuralist 
instrumentalism. (The colloquial use of “networking” as a conscious strategy for getting 
ahead would be an example of this model.) The third model outlined by E&G is 
structuralist constructionism, which takes most seriously the interplay between culture, 
agency, and networks. In this model, actors’ identities and normative commitments 
interact with network structure to produce action. Though E&G claim that, to that point, 
no existing research had made full use of the possibilities inherent in the constructionist 
view, they offer it as the most promising site for development in network theory. 
Following Archer (1988), E&G reject the idea that culture and structure are analytically 
inseparable from one another, and suggest that researchers should attempt to model the 
over-time interplay of normative commitments and network structures. They conclude, 
“Network analysis … neglects or inadequately conceptualizes the crucial dimension of 
subjective meaning and motivation—including the normative commitments of actors—
and thereby fails to show exactly how it is that intentional, creative human action serves 
in part to constitute those very social networks that so powerfully constrain actors” (p. 
1413). 
Though E&G’s extremely helpful exegesis of network theory has been widely 
cited, it appears not to have had a large influence on the actual practice of network 
analysis in sociology. David Smilde (2005), who relies heavily on E&G to frame his 
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recent investigation of networks and religious conversion, is able to make many of the 
same criticisms of network research that E&G had made over a decade prior. But 
Smilde’s research, while it greatly advances our understanding of network dynamics by 
creatively linking the influence-based and agentic notions of networks, does not help us 
better understand the normative dimension of network formation alluded to by E&G. 
Perhaps one of the reasons for this absence of engagement is that scholars—explicitly 
including E&G—are wary of falling back into “values-based” sociology, which they 
identify with disciplinary pariahs Talcott Parsons and structural functionalism. Although 
receptive to cultural causation when couched in language like “narratives” or “discourse,” 
E&G for some reason resist the straightforward idea that people might select into 
networks based on the normative beliefs they have internalized from different narratives 
or strains of discourse (see Smith 2003). The relationship between normative beliefs and 
networks is an empirical question, however, and must be approached empirically. But is 
there any a priori reason to hypothesize that normative beliefs might lead to changes in 
network composition in their own right? 
Lizardo’s (2006) review of the networks and culture literature makes an important 
contribution that can indirectly shed light on the role that beliefs might play in shaping 
social networks. Though Lizardo’s substantive focus in on cultural consumption rather 
than on normative beliefs, he relies on two insights from the literature that also open up 
space for thinking about normative influences on social networks. First, he points to the 
finding that networks are not the “hard,” durable configurations that are implied by the 
metaphor of “social structure.” In fact, studies repeatedly show tremendous turnover in 
individual social networks, even over short periods of time. Second, consistent with 
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Bourdieu’s work on the habitus, research on taste shows that people’s likes and dislikes 
are formed early and are remarkably durable. Based on this, Lizardo draws the 
unorthodox conclusion that the “infrastructure” of networks is actually much less stable 
than the “superstructure” of cultural preferences. On the basis of this insight, he goes on 
to demonstrate that cultural tastes themselves appear to have an effect on the composition 
of respondents’ social networks. 
Research on values and moral beliefs shows a very similar pattern to that of 
tastes—that is, they are formed early on in life and are largely stable thereafter (see 
Halaby 2003; Hitlin and Piliavin 2004). Moreover, a number of social theorists have 
called for extending Bourdieu’s concept of habitus from the realm of “cultural capital” to 
the realm of moral dispositions and commitments (Lamont 1992; Sayer 2005; see also 
Calhoun 1991; Smith 2003). Thus, the same rationale that exists for examining the effect 
of cultural consumption on networks also exists for investigating the effect of normative 
commitments on networks. Rather than refusing to consider how moral beliefs or values 
might shape social networks in a causal way (out of a fear of being too “Parsonian”), we 
should make this causal relationship an empirical question. The data used in this study 
allow us to do just that. 
 
DATA 
The data for this study come from Waves 1 and 2 of the National Study of Youth 
and Religion (NSYR), a random-digit-dial survey of American teenagers begun in 2002. 
The first wave of the NSYR is a random sample of English- and Spanish-speaking 
teenagers (ages 13-17) in the United States. A total of 3,290 teenagers were interviewed. 
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The final response rate was 57 percent (for more details, see Smith and Denton 2005). 
Wave 2 data collection began in 2005 and an attempt was made to contact all of the teen 
respondents from Wave 1, who were then between 15 and 20 years of age. The retention 
rate between waves was about 78 percent. I employ an appropriate weight for all analyses 
(see Smith and Denton 2005). Because of missing data, the N for each analysis varies 
between 2100 and 2140. 
These data are particularly well-suited to the question of normative influences on 
network composition for a number of reasons. First, the data contain information on a 
number of measures of network composition at two waves (2002 and 2005). Second, the 
data provide two measures of moral worldview that have been successfully employed in 
previous research (Baker 2005; Hunter 2000). Third, the data contain a wide variety of 
information on socioeconomic and demographic characteristics that might also be 
predictive of changes in network composition, thus allowing controls for confounding 
factors. 
 
MEASURES 
Dependent Variables 
NETWORK COMPOSITION: The outcomes of interest here are the number of each 
respondent’s friends who (1) “do drugs or drink a lot of alcohol,” (2) “have been in 
trouble in school for fighting, cheating, or skipping classes,” and (3) “regularly do 
volunteer work or community service.” This value was generated by asking the 
respondent to name up to five “closest friends,” and asking which of those friends engage 
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in the activities in question. This data was collected in 2005, during Wave 2 of the 
NSYR.  
 
Independent Variables 
LAGGED DEPENDENT VARIABLES: These measures reflect the composition of the 
respondent’s social network at Wave 1 of the survey (2002). They were constructed 
identically to the measures at Wave 2.  
MORAL CULTURE/MORAL WORLDVIEW: The NSYR provides two ways of 
measuring moral-cultural worldview. The first is based on Hunter’s (2000) 
operationalization of the Bellah team’s expressivist-utiltarian-civic-biblical typology 
offered in Habits of the Heart (1985). This question asks, “If you were unsure of what 
was right or wrong in a particular situation, how would you decide what to do? Would 
you… 1) Do what would make you feel happy (expressive individualist [chosen by 26 
percent]), 2) Do what would help you to get ahead (utilitarian individualist [11 percent]), 
3) Follow the advice of a teacher, parent, or other adult you respect (community-centered 
[42 percent]), or 4) Do what you think God or scripture tells you is right (theistic [21 
percent])?” A single item measure is of course not ideal, and as a measure of moral 
worldview, this question is certainly not exhaustive of the possibilities. Nevertheless, as a 
single item, it is well-matched to the Bellah typology and was explicitly designed to 
measure these moral worldviews in the teenage and young adult population.2 
Furthermore, in his research, Hunter (2000) found that one’s response to this question 
predicted other survey responses in a huge number of domains and with a high degree of 
                                                 
2
 This question was based on the one developed by Hunter (2000), but it was modified by Christian Smith 
for use in the National Study of Youth and Religion. 
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discrimination. There is therefore reason to hypothesize that these differences might also 
lead to differences in social networks. Since drug using and getting into trouble represent 
“deviance,” one should find that the more traditional community and theistic worldviews 
are negatively associated with these outcomes. On the other hand, since both community 
and theistic moralities are “collectivist” (Hitlin 2003; Oishi et al. 1998) one should expect 
that they will be positively associated with acquiring or maintaining strong ties to regular 
community volunteers. 
The second measure of moral worldview is an indicator of moral absolutism and 
relativism that closely resembles that used on the World Values Survey (see Baker 2005). 
This question asks, “Some people say that morals are relative, that there are no definite 
rights and wrongs for everybody. Do you agree or disagree?” The respondent could 
simply agree (1) or disagree (0). Since research in this area shows that relativists are more 
likely to accept practices that have been traditionally frowned upon (such as abortion or 
premarital sex; see Baker 2005) and less likely to derive a sense of community from 
others (Ryle and Robinson 2006), I hypothesize that relativists will develop or maintain 
more network ties to controlled substance users and maintain fewer network ties to 
regular volunteers than will absolutists.3 
OTHER CONTROLS: In addition to the usual demographic controls, several other 
factors are included to attempt to rule out potential spurious associations. To exclude the 
possibility that adult network connections are driving the community moral worldview 
response, I control for closeness to parents and adult network closure around the 
                                                 
3
 Despite Baker’s (2005) assertion that the Hunter question and the relativism question are interchangeable 
measures of absolutism, Smith’s revision of Hunter’s question and a question about moral relativism are 
only moderately associated (η =.172) in the NSYR. 
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respondent.4 To rule out the possibility that religious networks or institutions are driving 
the theistic response, I control for religious attendance, religious tradition, and the 
number of close friends who share the respondent’s religious beliefs. Altogether, these 
sociodemographic and network controls should account for the institutional and 
interactional context that is usually held to shape beliefs, networks, and action in the 
sociology of culture (Lichterman 1996; Swidler 2001; see also Campbell 1996). 
Furthermore, I control for relevant behavior at Wave 1 (frequency of using marijuana and 
getting drunk for drug using networks; cheating, cutting class or getting suspended for 
“trouble” networks; and volunteering for volunteer networks) in order to account for 
behavioral homophily and isolate the effects of the moral worldviews as much as 
possible. 
 
MODELS 
Because the outcomes of interest are counts, I use Poisson regression to estimate 
changes in network composition.5 These models control for prior network composition, 
moral worldview, and a number of other sociodemographic controls. Because the goal is 
to determine the effect of a durable state (moral worldview) on change in network 
composition between survey waves, I use a lagged dependent variable model rather than 
a fixed-effects specification (see Halaby 2004). Though the longitudinal nature of the 
data ensure causal order, the models estimated here necessarily make the assumption that 
the specified lag (two-and-a-half to three years) is an appropriate one for detecting the 
                                                 
4
 See the Appendix for descriptive statistics and definitions for all variables. 
 
5
 It is debatable here whether a Poisson, negative binomial, ordered logistic, or Tobit model is most 
appropriate here. We have estimated the models with all four specifications and the results are 
substantively identical. 
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causal relationships I have hypothesized. Although this assumption may not be tenable in 
all cases, it seems plausible in the case of analyzing possible effects of moral worldviews 
on network change in this population. 
In addition to estimating coefficients and test statistics, I compare effect sizes by 
comparing percent changes in the estimated count. For dichotomous variables, I use the 
percentage change in estimated count for an estimate of effect size. For the other 
variables, I use the percent change associated with a one standard deviation change in the 
predictor (see Long 1997). These values will allow comparing the relative net strength of 
each predictor. 
 
RESULTS 
Table 2.1 shows the results of the regression models predicting Wave 2 network 
composition. The table is largely self-explanatory, but there are several results worth 
highlighting. As one would expect, network composition in 2002 is a good predictor of 
network composition in 2005. Of course, we cannot know whether or not the same 
individuals are in the network, but there is a tendency for network characteristics to 
remain the same. This finding should not be taken as indicating the exceptional durability 
of such networks, however; the polychoric correlations (not shown in the table) between 
Wave 1 and Wave 2 network composition are .47 for controlled substance use, .29 for 
trouble, and .33 for volunteering. Therefore, while there are clear continuities in network 
characteristics, there is plenty of variation to account for between survey waves. This is 
consistent with previous research that shows high volatility in network ties even in time 
spans as short as one year (Burt 2000; Wellman et al 1997). The multivariate models also 
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show that prior behavior (e.g., getting drunk, cheating, volunteering) is also a good 
predictor of future network composition, indicating a theoretically expected tendency 
toward behavioral homophily. That is, people tend to develop ties with individuals who 
are similar to themselves in terms of lifestyle habits (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 
2001).  
In addition to continuity and homophily, only one other factor was significant in 
all three models: moral worldview as measured by Smith’s revision of Hunter’s (2000) 
Bellah-inspired indicator. Compared to the community norms-centered reference 
category (“follow the advice of an adult”), young people espousing an expressivist 
worldview (“makes me happy”) are more likely to develop or maintain strong ties with 
heavy substance users and “troublemakers” and—along with utilitarian (“get ahead”) 
respondents—less likely to develop or maintain strong ties with regular volunteers. Again 
compared to the community norms-centered respondents, youth invoking a theistic moral 
worldview are less likely to develop or maintain friendships with controlled substance 
users and “troublemakers.” It should be noted that here that these are not simply 
“religious” youth in the usual sense; religious attendance and conservative religious 
tradition play no role here. The 21 percent of teenagers who identify with the theistic 
worldview are not identical to the teens one might otherwise call “religious” based on 
standard measures. If some form of “social control” is at work here, it is a social control 
over and above adult connections, parent monitoring, religious tradition, networks of 
religious friends, and church attendance.  
The “effect size” column for each model allows us to compare the relative 
strength of the significant predictors. These results seem surprising from the point of 
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view of a standard network approach, but are perhaps unsurprising given the arguments 
of Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994) and Lizardo (2006): moral worldview has a larger (in 
some instances much larger) net effect on Wave 2 network composition than a change of 
one (or several) standard deviations in either Wave 1 network composition or previous 
behavior. In this population at least, worldview predicts changes in the content of social 
networks much better than race, sex, household income, parents’ education and a host of 
other factors. To get a better sense of these predicted differences, Figure 2.1 shows the 
predicted counts by worldview for Wave 2 network characteristics holding all other 
covariates at their means. Taken together, these results are certainly noteworthy—a 
single, relatively abstract moral question, asked nearly three years earlier, is more 
predictive of future friendship networks than either prior networks, behavioral 
homophily, or demographic characteristics. Such a possibility is seldom, if ever, 
acknowledged in the literature on networks and culture, which usually conceive of 
cultural beliefs as driven by social interaction, rather than vice versa. 
 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES: DO NETWORKS SHAPE WORLDVIEW? 
I have argued that cultural sociology and network theory need to move beyond 
deterministic and “conflationist” views of the culture-structure relationship to investigate 
empirically their dynamic relationship. Though the emphasis in this paper is exploring 
the role that moral-cultural worldviews play in shaping network change, I also briefly 
consider here the other side of the dynamic process: the role that prior networks might 
play in influencing changes in worldview. From Wave 1 to Wave 2, 54 percent of 
respondents changed their response to the moral worldview question, though only 33 
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percent made the substantively larger change (in either direction) between an 
individualist response and either of the more collectivist responses. With only one item, 
these figures undoubtedly reflect randomness and measurement error, but significant 
patterns should be detectable nonetheless. 
Table 2.2 shows the results of a multinomial logistic regression model predicting 
moral worldview at Wave 2 using all of the Wave 1 predictors used in Table 2.1. This 
model treats the community-centered option as the reference category at both waves. 
Because the significance of a single coefficient is dependent on its difference from the 
reference category only, we also present Wald X2 tests for the joint significance of each 
predictor across all three equations. We do not take the time here to substantively 
interpret each coefficient, but rather note findings that are directly relevant to our 
theoretical concern.  
First, the best predictor of worldview at Wave 2 is worldview at Wave 1. Given 
the assertion above about the durability of cultural worldviews, this is perhaps not 
surprising. The strong tie variables, on the other hand, are not significant predictors of 
these changes, again intimating the relative durability of cognitive structures relative to 
proximate peer influence. There is, however, some evidence of structural effects on 
worldview change. Adult network closure around the respondent is associated with a 
lower probability of adopting or maintaining either of the individualist worldviews. That 
is, a dense network of adult involvement seems to dispose teenagers to adopting or 
maintaining a more collectivist worldview. A similar pattern emerges for parental 
monitoring as well, with greater supervision negatively associated with choosing “what 
makes me happy.” Church attendance is also a good predictor of maintaining or adopting 
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a religious worldview. Overall, then, there appears to be a fair degree of stability in 
cultural worldviews though we also find a limited, though readily interpretable, degree of 
structural influence over a three year time span. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The goal of this paper has been to empirically investigate factors related to the 
formation of social networks over time. Inspired by Emirbayer and Goodwin’s (1994) 
important essay on networks and culture, this study looked specifically at how moral 
worldviews influence changes in network formation over time in the lives of American 
young people. The results show, consistent with Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994) and 
Archer (1988), that cultural beliefs play an independent role in forming and changing 
social structures. Though many sociologists would be willing to admit this of course, the 
vast majority of research in this area assumes (intentionally or not) that the relevant 
causal pathway is always from networks to cultural beliefs. 
One question that might legitimately be posed at this point is: Is there really any 
culture here? Admittedly, calling a single survey question an indicator of “culture” 
requires some justification. As I noted earlier, the four-part moral worldview question is a 
modified version of the item designed by Hunter (2000) to measure the Habits of the 
Heart typology in survey analysis. It is therefore indirectly based on the extensive 
fieldwork undertaken for that project. Further analyses (not shown here) also show that 
this question is more “central” than most in the sense that it is highly correlated with 
nearly every opinion or attitude measure on both the NSYR and using Hunter’s original 
data, even with items that are not strongly correlated with each other. Although it is 
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phrased as a simple question about moral judgment, it is likely tapping (as it was intended 
to) into larger, culturally available worldviews.  
This result does not lead us to the Parsonian “consensualism” or “idealism” that 
E&G warn us about. These moral worldviews are not pieces of a unitary culture, but are 
often in conflict with each other (see Baker 2005; Hunter 2000). Neither do they stand for 
free-floating ideas, since these moral “schemas” are strongly connected to structural 
“resources” in society (Sewell 1992). Other research using these data (in progress) 
demonstrates that different responses to this item are linked to different religious and 
occupational parental backgrounds and even to different favorite television shows and 
musical artists. While this evidence is not conclusive, it does suggest that the response to 
this single survey question is more than idiosyncratic opinion or personality; it may in 
fact tell us something at the individual level about the larger moral-cultural themes 
identified in studies like Habits of the Heart. 
In addition to their potential theoretical significance, these results also speak to 
the substantive concerns expressed by the Bellah team (1985). Among other things, the 
authors expressed concern that individualism would lead to lower levels of civic 
engagement. Subsequent ethnographic research by Lichterman (1996) cast doubt on this 
concern, but the analysis here suggests that Bellah may have been on to something after 
all. Among American youth, at least, individualist worldviews (doing what “makes me 
happy” or “what will help me get ahead”) are indeed associated with decreased 
connections to socially engaged peers compared to their more community- or religion-
oriented counterparts. The consequences of moral worldviews for developing adult 
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volunteering networks and their implications for actual volunteering behavior should be 
the subject of future research. 
All sociologists agree that networks matter. But it is time to problematize the 
formation of social networks in order to gain a fuller understanding of their emergence. 
Gathering network data at multiple survey waves should be a high priority for future data 
collections in order to move from philosophical discussion to a more empirically 
grounded perspective. Our theories often take cultural causes seriously but fail to 
integrate them into empirical models. There is every reason to believe that culture exists 
not only “out there” as codes or narratives but “in here” in the form of schemas or habitus 
and that this internalized culture plays a role in actors’ everyday choices (Bourdieu 1984; 
DiMaggio 1997; Lizardo 2006; Strauss and Quinn 1997). For cultural sociologists, a truly 
cultural account of motivation is clearly preferable to the rational-choice default which so 
often quietly colonizes our work (Calhoun 1991; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Smith 
2003). This study is but one step in helping develop such an account. 
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Table 2.1. Results of Poisson Regressions Predicting Wave 2 Network Composition 
 Substance Using 
Ties 
 “In Trouble” 
Strong Ties 
 Volunteeing 
Strong Ties 
 β Effect 
size 
 β Effect 
size 
  β Effect 
size 
Prior Networks           
Using Strong Ties  .083***   11.1 ---    ---  
In Trouble Strong Ties ---   .132*** 11.8   ---  
Volunteering Strong Ties ---   ---     .106***   16.9 
Moral Worldviews          
Expressivist  .129*   13.8 .203** 22.5   -.305***  -26.3 
Utilitarian  .080   .077    -.303*  -26.1 
Theistic -.211*  -19.0 -.226* -20.2    .027  
Community (reference) ---   ---    ---  
Moral Relativist  .083   -.096    -.026  
Other Network Characteristics         
Same Religion Strong Ties -.010   -.001     .042*    8.9 
Adult Network Closure  .004   -.011     .033  
Dating  .094   .063    -.098  
Number of Strong Ties -.004   .039    -.078  
Prior Behavior          
Frequency of Drunkenness  .053*    5.1 ---    ---  
Frequency of Smoking Pot  .130***    9.9 ---    ---  
Frequency of Cheating ---   .053* 11.8   ---  
Frequency of Cutting Class ---   .177*** 7.1   ---  
Ever Suspended ---   .211** 23.5   ---  
Frequency of Volunteering ---   ---     .087**    9.2 
Family Characteristics          
Parent Monitoring -.079**   -7.5 -.038     .095**    9.8 
Two-Parent Bio Family -.153**  -14.2 -.127     .113  
Closeness to Parents -.030   .012     .010  
Religious Participation and Identity         
Church Attendance  .009   -.022     .016  
Conservative Protestant -.075   .090     .074  
Black Protestant  .084   -.222    -.011  
Mainline Protestant -.099   .070     .059  
Catholic -.038   .008    -.014  
Jewish -.355*  -29.9 -.192     .188  
Mormon (LDS) -.186   -.019     .114  
Other Religion -.100   -.151     .441*   55.5 
Indeterminate Religion -.163   .024    -.411  
No Religion (reference) ---   ---    ---  
Demographic and Other Characteristics         
Gender (female = 1) -.183***  -16.7 -.292*** 25.3    .012  
Age (W1)  .020   -.096*** 12.5   -.004  
Black -.188   .248* 28.1   -.148  
Other race -.151*  -14.0 .021     .085  
Southern Residence -.084   -.013    -.119  
GPA -.057   -.115** -7.6    .111*    7.9 
Household Income  .027*    9.1 .000     .005  
Parent Education -.006   -.028* -7.3    .038**   11.2 
          
N  2140   2116     2100             
χ²  588.75   474.49     394.62             
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Notes: Effect sizes calculated as the percentage change in count associated with the 
presence (versus absence) of a dichotomous variable or a one-SD change in a non-
dichotomous variable. Effect sizes are only displayed for significant variables. Non-
dichotomous effect sizes are italicized. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Predicted Number of Strong Ties at Wave 2 by Worldview 
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Table 2.2. Wave 1 Predictors of Wave 2 Worldview 
Outcome (W2; Community Reference) Expressive Utilitarian Theistic Wald Test 
 b b b  
Prior Worldview     
Expressivist 1.106*** .876*** .025 *** 
Utilitarian .534** .848*** .205 ** 
Theistic .553** .733** 1.242*** *** 
Community (reference)     
Moral Relativist .225 -.120 -.391** *** 
Prior Network Composition     
Using Strong Ties -.009 -.081 .015  
In Trouble Strong Ties -.006 -.172 -.067  
Volunteering Strong Ties .049 -.020 .082  
Prior Behavior     
Frequency of Drunkenness .015 .153 .072  
Frequency of Smoking Pot .161 .392** .031 * 
Frequency of Cheating .117* .015 .111* * 
Frequency of Cutting Class .057 .160 .141  
Ever Suspended -.203 .254 -.243  
Frequency of Volunteering .045 -.025 -.121  
Other Network Characteristics     
Same Religion Strong Ties .018 -.040 .058  
Adult Network Closure -.162** -.168* .061 ** 
Dating .035 .034 -.150  
Number of Strong Ties .177 .270* -.028  
Family Characteristics     
Parent Monitoring -.153* -.117 .122 ** 
Two-Parent Biological Family -.165 .029 -.047  
Closeness to Parents -.009 -.034 .024  
Religious Participation     
Church Attendance -.054 -.028 .142*** *** 
Conservative Protestant -.307 .182 .536  
Black Protestant -.255 -.356 -.239  
Mainline Protestant .350 .411 .375  
Catholic -.120 .122 -.440  
Jewish -.177 -1.478 .671  
Mormon (LDS) -.448 -.025 .682  
Other Religion .466 .654 1.065*  
Indeterminate Religion .488 1.164* .632  
No Religion (reference)     
Demographic and Other Characteristics     
Gender (female = 1) -.049 -.286 -.444** ** 
Age (W1) -.065 -.161* -.001  
Black -.411 .499 .247  
Other race -.287 .395 .113 * 
Southern Residence -.100 -.173 -.015  
GPA -.028 .064 .197  
Household Income .000 -.027 -.016  
Parent Education -.019 .066 -.007  
Constant -.260 -1.343 -2.442*  
N 2098 
χ² 650.31 
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CHAPTER 3: STRUCTURE, CULTURE, AND COMMUNITY 
Few concepts have generated as much theoretical speculation and as little 
scientific payoff as “community.” While Tönnies’s ([1897] 1988) distinction between 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft resides at the heart of sociology – or at least at the heart of 
sociology’s historical origins – it has generated little generalizable knowledge about the 
social world. This has not, however, stopped community from playing an important role 
in social scientific and political discourse. Among classical theorists, Durkheim’s notions 
of anomie and solidarity, Weber’s warnings about the “iron cage” of rationalization, and 
Marx’s concerns about alienation from our “species being” all speak to a greater or lesser 
degree to the disappearance of “authentic” relational life in modernity (see Delanty 
2003). Although the nostalgic narrative of “Community Lost” seemed to fade among 
sociologists in the years following World War II (see Smith 2003), there is ample 
evidence of resurgent interest. Recently, for example, there has been a renaissance of 
concern for community under the auspices of social capital theory (see Field 2003:5). 
Though he is ostensibly not fond of the term “community,” Robert Putnam nevertheless 
chose “The Collapse and Revival of American Community” as the subtitle for Bowling 
Alone (2000), suggesting that the social capital literature deals with many of the same 
issues under a different name. 
Community can be a slippery term and I do not seek to solve its conceptual 
problems once and for all. My goal is more modest: to explore the structural and cultural 
mechanisms that lead to the experience of community in communal groups. I begin with 
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the simple observation that individuals and groups subjectively experience their social 
relationships in different ways and argue that an important dimension of this variation 
tracks along Tönnies’ distinction between “natural” and “rational” will. To investigate the 
structural and cultural origins of these differing relational experiences in communal 
settings, I rely on data from the Urban Communes Project (UCP), a collection of 
ethnographic, network, and survey data that was collected in 1974-1975 from 60 urban 
communes in the United States. 
Communes are not of course representative of all attempts to create face-to-face 
community. Nevertheless, as Kanter (1972) and Zablocki (1980) have pointed out, 
communes are strategic sites for engaging with important sociological questions about 
alienation, anomie, and solidarity. Despite their limitations, communes as bounded social 
entities offer the rare opportunity to observe mechanisms of interaction, solidarity, and 
social conflict on a scale that is more tractable than with larger, less clearly defined, and 
less intentional units of analysis such as neighborhoods. The UCP data are particularly 
valuable because they contain information on groups that are much more varied than one 
might expect given popular stereotypes. While some UCP communes were intense and 
demanded large investments of time, resources, and ideological commitment, others were 
little more than “crash pads” organized around a vague desire for communal life.19 The 
heterogeneity of the sample facilitates meaningful analysis and comparison, providing a 
valuable opportunity to observe basic social processes at work in discrete, clearly 
bounded entities (Zablocki 1980). I further discuss the advantages and disadvantages of 
studying such groups below. 
                                                 
19
 For example, in some UCP groups the average member spent almost 24 hours a day on site, while in 
others the average was less than 10 hours per day (barely enough time to sleep, dress, and eat). 
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To understand how and why some of these groups led to an intense experience of 
Gemeinschaft while others did not, I rely on various social and political theories of 
community to suggest plausible causal mechanisms. I distinguish between two general 
types of explanation – the structural (i.e., mechanisms grounded in organizational factors) 
and the substantive (i.e., mechanisms grounded in cultural meanings). This division is by 
no means novel; it corresponds roughly to the historic divide between formal theories of 
community that have their origins in Plato, Hobbes, and Rousseau and the more spiritual 
or emotional theories of community linked to Augustine and Johannes Althusius (see 
Keller 2003:16-36). While this debate has typically been about how to best define 
community, however, I treat these perspectives as alternative theoretical frameworks for 
generating testable hypotheses. Each tradition proposes different mechanisms that may be 
responsible for generating what Kanter (1972) calls the “we-feeling” – a sense of group 
identification and solidarity. 
While the regression analyses below suggest that substantive theories of 
community are generally more consistent with these data than structural theories, fuzzy-
set techniques shed light on important ways in which cultural and structural factors work 
together to produce—or prevent—the presence of Gemeinschaft. I argue below that this 
two-method strategy is essential for capturing both proximate mechanisms and “the 
duality of structure” simultaneously (Sewell 1992). In addition to highlighting a novel 
analytic approach, the analyses in this paper supply two main substantive contributions: 
first, an improved account of the factors that produce the we-feeling in communal groups; 
and second, some empirical evidence that suggests the value of reconsidering culture’s 
role in producing community in face-to-face groups. 
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Community as Experience 
Both Tönnies ([1887] 1988) and Weber ([1921] 1978) relied on the experience of 
particular kinds of relationships in order to get leverage on the community concept. 
Tönnies contrasted the “natural will” (i.e., bonds based on affect and trust) with the 
“rational will” (i.e., associations based on mutual advantage or contract). Weber ([1922] 
1978:40-43) relied on a similar, though not identical, division between motivational 
orientations, with substantive rationality underlying communal action and instrumental 
rationality underlying “associative” action (see Brint 2001:3f). I discuss issues of 
definition and measurement below, but in general terms the outcome of interest here 
could be called “the experience of Gemeinschaft,” we-feeling, a sense of collective self, 
or the feeling of natural belonging (Bender 1978; Kanter 1972; Keller 2003). 
Some scholars have criticized this subjective view as insufficiently grounded in 
specific patterns of interaction (e.g. Calhoun 1980; see also Wuthnow 1989). They have 
usually based their criticism on the fact that some social patterns co-occur with the 
experience of the “natural will.” This is of course true, and if one were simply interested 
in providing yet another definition or typology of community, the categories of 
experience or “will” would indeed be inadequate. But, as Keller (2003:xi) notes, the 
original impetus for studying community emerges out of the question, “Where can I be at 
home?” Durkheim’s anomie and Marx’s estrangement, for example, while grounded in 
macrostructures of collective representations or material production, become salient in 
our experience of them as persons. Like the study of income inequality or racial 
discrimination, the study of community ultimately derives its importance from its 
consequences for human lives (Sayer 2005:11-12). Though studying community-as-
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experience does not capture all dimensions of the concept, it does encompass a 
theoretically justifiable and subjectively important aspect of human life.  
There are two principal schools of thought used to explain the experience of 
Gemeinschaft: the structural and the substantive. Though the distinction between the two 
is not hard and fast, it is nevertheless highly useful. Structural theories explain 
community in terms of a set of organizational properties such as power relations, 
“dynamic density,” the built environment, or other formal characteristics. Substantive 
theories, on the other hand, explain Gemeinschaft as a product of moral order. I now turn 
to a brief outline of these theories, their associated mechanisms, and their implications for 
the study of the Gemeinschaft experience in communes. 
 
Structural Theories of Community 
One exemplary structural theory comes from the social neworks and social capital 
tradition. Though rarely stated explictly, Putnam (2000:19) comes closest to giving a 
formal articulation of this view: “[S]ocial capital refers to connections among 
individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise 
from them” (emphasis added). On this account, the norms and trust that constitute major 
aspects of community are emergent from the “infrastructure” of the social networks that 
underlie them (for a review of this literature, see Field 2003). The relationship between 
networks and culture here is one of “structural determinism” (Emirbayer and Goodwin 
1994). 
This network-influenced view is not only widespread among those who want to 
understand community, but also among those who seek to promote it. Putnam (2000:204-
15) and Brint (2001), for instance, speak to the importance of physical space, advocating 
  78 
the creation of “well-traveled paths and common meeting places” that will provide 
“opportunities for interaction” (Brint 2001:19). An emphasis on the vital importance of 
physical space also underlies New Urbanism, an enormously influential planning 
philosophy that is behind the creation of hundreds of planned communities in the United 
States (Calthorpe 1993; Katz 1994). What all of these theories have in common is the 
assumption that a shared identity and meaning emerge from the spatio-temporal 
organization of social life. Solidarity is viewed as the by-product of interaction. 
Another important strand of structural theory also comes from network theory and 
has its clearest incarnation in the work of McPherson and colleagues (e.g., McPherson 
and Rotolo 1996). These scholars have done compelling research showing that the 
distribution of individuals in “Blau space” (that is, the multidimensional space defined by 
various sociodemographic variables) influences the relative growth of voluntary 
organizations. The presumed engine behind this phenomenon is homophily—that actors 
who are alike in their education, income, or other sociodemographic characteristics will 
tend to gravitate toward and interact with each other (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 
2001). While McPherson and colleagues do not specifically address the issue of 
community in Tönnies’s sense, their work suggests that social homogeneity may be an 
important factor leading to the experience of community. 
Finally, Steven Brint’s (2001) work on community can also be placed squarely in 
the structural camp. I have already noted his focus on interaction as a catalyst for 
Gemeinschaft. He goes further than this, however, drawing on the work of Kanter (1972) 
and others to suggest other mechanisms that can serve as “instruments of community-
building” (Brint 2001, Table 2). He classifies these mechanisms into two groups: 
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voluntaristic and sacrificial (see also Kanter 1972:68-74). Voluntaristic mechanisms 
include well-traveled meeting places, regular times for gathering, ritual occasions, and 
“socioemotional leadership.” The first three are variants on the spatio-temporal themes 
already discussed. (Ritual, while not merely spatio-temporal, is certainly structural in that 
it is based in Durkheim’s [(1912) 2001] later sociology of religion, which largely 
disregards substantive content.) “Socioemotional leadership,” according to Brint, means 
that group leaders are to organize their group’s culture “out of the materials of personality 
and experience” rather than out of shared beliefs or moral commitments (p. 19). 
Sacrificial mechanisms are meant to separate individuals from outgroups by 
demanding sacrifices. Unlike voluntaristic mechanisms, which are (largely) grounded in 
the shared, elective use of spatio-temporal resources, sacrificial mechanisms imply strong 
authority and high levels of investment. The four mechanisms advanced by Brint (2001, 
Table 2) are: hazing, the renunciation of pleasure(s), investment of time and/or money, 
and enforced changes in appearance and expression. The organizing principles of these 
mechanisms are authority and investment – that is, group leaders set controls on entry as 
well as on the required behavior of members. There is a strong parallel here to rational 
choice theories of religion, which identify “strictness” as a primary mechanism behind 
variation in organizational growth (see Iannaccone 1994). Advocates of this view hold 
that by screening out free-riders, strict groups create higher levels of average investment, 
creating a better shared experience for participating members.  
In general, then, the proposed mechanisms of structural theories can be grouped 
under four headings: (1) spatio-temporal interaction, (2) homophily, (3) authority, and (4) 
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investment. With these in mind, I now turn to a review of substantive theories of 
community. 
 
 
Substantive Theories of Community 
The overriding concern of substantive theories is that ideas, culture, and identity 
matter at least as much as social structure for the development of particular forms of 
social interaction. One theorist who has been particularly critical of structural theories is 
Amitai Etzioni (2001). Etzioni contends that while Putnam (2000) and others are correct 
that interactions are a necessary part of community they are not in and of themselves 
sufficient to produce it. He argues, “[W]ithout shared values, communities are unable to 
withstand centrifugal forces… For these reasons, the mainstays of community cannot be 
bowling leagues, bird watching societies, and chess clubs” (Etzioni 2001:224). These 
types of organizations are not adequate, he contends, because they are not formed around 
shared moral cultures (see also MacIntyre 1981; Sandel 1996, 2001).  
Charles Taylor (2003) shares with communitarian theorists a focus on moral 
order. Taylor argues that both individual and group identity are firmly grounded on what 
actors intersubjectively hold to be good or valuable in life (see Taylor 1989, 1991, 2003). 
Taylor is not an idealist; he simply argues that practices (such as those posited by 
structural theories) can have no social power unless they are interpreted through the 
“hermeneutic key” of shared moral order (see Taylor 2003:23-30). He contends that 
shared interpretive understanding “makes possible common practices and a widely shared 
sense of legitimacy” (2003:23). In other words, without a common understanding about 
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what a given practice means in the context of a group’s day-to-day interactions, it cannot 
provide a basis for solidarity.  
Taylor’s work has been translated into sociological theory primarily through the 
writings of Craig Calhoun (1991) and Christian Smith (1998, 2003). While Calhoun 
stresses in a general way the importance of moral horizons for grounding individual and 
collective selves, Smith has adapted these ideas for empirical inquiry. Smith’s (1998) 
subcultural theory of religious strength maintains (contra rational choice theory) that 
“strict churches” are not strong because they require investments, but rather because they 
inspire a shared and morally salient group identity. Proposition 1 of Smith’s (1998:90) 
theory holds that “[t]he human drives for meaning and belonging are satisfied primarily 
by locating human selves within social groups that sustain distinctive, morally orienting 
collective identities” (emphasis added). In contrast to the structural mechanisms 
considered previously, these substantive theories possess a common core – the 
importance of the mechanism of shared moral order for generating a sense of belonging 
in face-to-face groups. 
 
DATA 
I test these theories of community using data from the Urban Communes Project, 
a stratified sample of urban communes collected in six U.S. metropolitan areas—Atlanta, 
Boston, Houston, Los Angeles, New York, and the Twin Cities—in 1974 and 1975. To 
be included in the sampling frame, groups had to have at least five members, and at least 
one member of each sex (or resident children). (This design was meant to exclude 
monasteries and convents.) The sample was drawn using a clustered quota design. To 
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maximize geographical diversity, six large Standard Metropolitan Sampling Areas from 
different regions across the United States were chosen for analysis. Fieldworkers in each 
city first compiled a comprehensive census of communes within the SMSA.  Ten 
communes in each SMSA were then selected on the basis of certain key variables such as 
ideological type, population size, and year founded (see Zablocki 1980). The study 
design included several different methodologies. Participant observers were sent to each 
of the communes and given a standardized form to fill out based on their observations. 
These observers also asked the members of each group to fill out a variety of survey 
instruments on attitudes, beliefs, and communal relationships (see Zablocki 1980 and 
Martin, Yeung, and Zablocki 2001). These data present a rich picture of life in a number 
of groups that were attempting to achieve the Gemeinschaft experience. Because of 
missing data on some theoretically important variables, the analyses in this paper are 
restricted to 50 groups. 
Though the questions that motivate this analysis concern the broader issue of 
“community,” the data are of course limited by their specificity. Communes are not 
representative of all attempts to build face-to-face community. Yet because producing the 
phenomenological experience of belonging was a major objective of these groups, they 
serve as valuable self-imposed experiments that permit testing predictions or recipes 
offered by very different theories in well-defined settings.  
Though the communes are demographically very similar—whiter, younger, and 
more educated than the general population—they also differ from one another in many 
ways. At the individual level, far from all sharing a similar ideology, Zablocki (1980:194) 
concluded on the basis of attitude surveys that commune members were “almost 
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maximally heterogeneous,” with the major difference between them and non-communal 
samples being the former’s relatively high rates of survey non-response. There are also 
group differences in ideology. The original research team devised a seven-part typology 
they deemed most useful for coding each group’s ideology (Zablocki 1980). Among the 
50 groups examined in this analysis, there are 14 Eastern religious, 8 Christian, 6 political 
(revolutionary), 7 countercultural (hippie), 5 alternative family, 7 cooperative living, and 
3 “psychological” communes.20 What is more relevant for this particular investigation, 
these 50 groups vary markedly in their degree of Gemeinschaft as well as in their levels 
of spatio-temporal interaction, social homogeneity, authority structures, investment, and 
strength of moral order. This variation is not simply an artifact of measuring relative 
differences between nearly identical groups; for example, as shown in Appendix 2, Table 
2A, the ratio-level variables show a great deal of variation, indicating real differences 
between groups. This leaves plenty of scope for testing links between the we-feeling and 
the various factors that are held to give rise to it.  
 
MEASURES AND METHODS 
Measuring the Experience of Community 
As I have argued above, one way to think of Gemeinschaft is as a kind of 
phenomenological experience characterized by what Tönnies ([1897] 1988) called the 
“natural will” or what Kanter (1972) referred to as the we-feeling. This refers to human 
relations based primarily on emotion and trust rather than on instrumentality. It is 
doubtful that a single measure could capture this multivalent concept (see Loomis and 
                                                 
20
 Since the ideological typology has little explanatory power beyond the other variables employed in the 
analysis, I do not spend more time defining these types. See Zablocki (1980:189-246) for more details. 
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McKinney 1956). Thus, while I also conduct replications using single measures (see 
Appendix B), I rely primarily on a scale of six different measures, one of which comes 
from ethnographic observation and the others from the survey data. A UCP ethnographer 
was asked to rate each commune’s level of “feeling of community”; possible values were 
“no feeling of ‘We the commune’ apparent among members, just feelings of a collection 
of individuals” (1); “minimal feeling of ‘We the commune,’ more dominant feelings of 
‘I’ among the members” (2); “feeling of ‘We the commune’ on certain occasions” (3); 
and “strong feeling of a sense of ‘We the commune’ among members.”21 I also used each 
group’s mean22 response to a number of individual-level survey questions. The measures 
used to construct the Gemeinschaft scale (coded so higher values are more Gemeinschaft-
like) are as follows: 
 “I feel the members of this commune are my true family” (5-point scale from 
“agree strongly” to “disagree strongly”) 
 “Most people in this commune are more inclined to look out for themselves 
than to consider the needs of others” (same coding) 
 “No one in this communal household is going to care much about what 
happens to me” (same coding) 
 “I think there is a very good chance I will still be living communally ten years 
from now” (same coding) 
                                                 
21
 Though for these and other ethnographer-coded measures there is no available interrater reliability, most 
scores were subsequently confirmed by the principal investigator, who also visited the research sites 
(Zablocki, personal communication). 
 
22
 For all individual-level measures in these analyses, I employ the group mean. The analyses were also 
tried using the group median and there were no meaningful differences. 
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 “If you were offered $10,000 in cash by an anonymous donor to leave this 
commune, and never again live communally in this house or with any of these 
same people (spouse, children, relatives excepted) would you: 1) definitely 
accept the offer, 2) have to think about it, 3) definitely reject the offer.” 
 
These measures each tap different, but related dimensions of the community 
experience. The first three deal with the affective quality of relations within the group, 
specifically the extent to which the members are attached to each other in a non-
instrumental way. The fourth question assesses each groups’s average degree of 
commitment to a communal lifestyle. The last directly tests whether each group’s 
communal relationships are reducible to instrumental value, directly capturing Weber’s 
and Tönnies’ distinction between natural (substantive) and instrumental motivations for 
interaction. To construct the overall measure of Gemeinschaft, I compute a scale from the 
ethnographers’ rating, the average value of the first four survey questions, and the 
proportion responding “definitely reject” to the hypothetical cash offer. (As with all 
scales in this study, the individual variables were standardized before summing to give 
equal weight to each component.) A factor analysis using varimax rotation (not shown 
here) confirms that all of these measures load on a single factor. Cronbach’s alpha for this 
scale is .84, and would not be improved by eliminating any of the individual measures.23 
 
Measuring Structural Mechanisms 
Above, I outlined four basic types of structural mechanisms – spatio-temporal 
organization, social homogeneity, authority, and investment. Fortunately, the UCP data 
                                                 
23
 Because most of the variables used in these analyses are categorical rather than continuous, I use the 
polychoric correlation coefficient (ρ; Stata -polychoric-) instead of Pearson’s r to compute α. 
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contain multiple measures in each of these categories. In the primary analysis, I use 
standardized scales to measure these concepts. In the supplemental analyses (Appendix 
B), however, I replicate key findings using single measures.  
Spatio-temporal interaction refers to the frequency that members of the commune 
interact with each other as members of the group. To assess the degree of interaction, I 
consider the following three measures: 1) the number of meetings per month, which 
ranges from 0 to 30; 2) the frequency of eating meals together, which is measured on a 
five-point scale – never, special occasions only, one meal per day, two meals per day, 
three meals per day; and 3) the log interpersonal density of the commune 
(log(persons/rooms)). Meetings and meals provide opportunities for ritual occasions and 
“collective effervescence” within the group, and interpersonal density increases necessity 
of physical interaction. When combined into a scale of spatio-temporal intensity, 
Cronbach’s alpha equals .72. 
Social homogeneity reflects the degree of social similarity between members of 
each commune. I consider potential homophily effects on three axes: age, education, and 
father’s occupational prestige. (There is no available question about individual race or 
income.) As noted above, these measures figure prominently in McPherson’s work on 
organizational growth and vitality (e.g., McPherson and Rotolo 1996). I measure age 
similarity by the group’s standard deviation in age. Because of the original question’s 
categorical response scale, I measure educational similarity by the probability that any 
two group members picked at random would have the same degree status (college vs. no 
college). Finally, I measure “class” similarity using the group’s standard deviation of 
father’s occupational prestige (based on 1970 Census occupational codes). Since the 
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differing forms of social homogeneity are conceptually very different, they are never 
combined into a single scale. 
Authority refers to the degree to which commune life is regulated by leader(s) 
with coercive power. To construct this measure, I rely on reports by the UCP participant 
observers. The first measure is the “extent of authority” in the commune, which varies on 
a four-point scale from “no authority recognized” to “high degree of authority.” The 
second reports the “extent of rules” in the commune, which can vary on a four-point scale 
from “no rules” to “many rules governing conduct and behavior.” The final measure of 
authority is derived from a series of five variables reported by UCP ethnographers. The 
observers were asked to report on the way the group made decisions in five areas: “the 
executive sphere,” defining values, making judgments, setting policy, and making 
specific house decisions. I include the number of these areas (0 to 6) in which decisions 
are made by leaders without consulting the group as a whole through either democratic or 
consensual processes.24 When all three measures are combined in an authority scale, 
Cronbach’s alpha equals .87. 
Investment refers to the amount of scarce resources a member or prospective 
member must devote to the commune. This construct is meant to assess how 
“demanding” the group is in terms of time, economic resources, and personal freedom. 
To construct this measure, I use three ethnographer reports and one survey item. The 
ethnographic variables are: the degree of economic communism (a four-point scale 
                                                 
24
 The possible codings for these variables were: no authority recognized, group consensus, group majority, 
multiple leaders, absentee leader, absentee leader with resident lieutenant, and single resident leader (or 
couple). On the basis of extensive exploratory analyses, the first three were coded 0 and the others 1 for the 
purposes of defining this measure. The means for the resulting variables range from .32 to .43 with the 
exception of defining values (.89). These indicators are almost perfectly correlated with each other (ρ > 
.92). 
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ranging from “no communism” to “virtually total communism”), and two dichotomous 
variables representing whether the group assigns chores to its members (rather than using 
a volunteer system), and whether a trial membership or novitiate is required to join the 
group. The survey-based measure is the number of hours the average member spent in the 
commune during the preceding three days. When combined into a scale of investment, 
Cronbach’s alpha equals .85. 
 
Measuring Substantive Mechanisms 
Following Smith (1998, 2003) and Taylor (1989), I define moral order as a group 
possessing a belief structure with two characteristics: sharedness and the capacity for 
orienting action.25 To get at these aspects of moral order, I rely on two ethnographic and 
two survey measures. Participant observers were asked to rate the “degree of consensus 
about commune’s ideology, values and beliefs among members” using a four point scale 
with options “much diversity,” “some homogeneity,” “great homogeneity,” and 
“ideological unity.” This reflects sharedness of beliefs. They also rated the “importance 
of ideology, values and beliefs in [each] commune’s life” on a three-point scale, which 
reflects the extent to which these shared beliefs are capable of being translated into 
action. To supplement these ethnographer-reported indicators, I also look to the 
individual-level data for indicators of morally-orienting beliefs. I take the average value 
of two survey measures (both measured on a five point scale from “agree strongly” to 
                                                 
25
 This definition rules out two conditions that might qualify as shared beliefs but not as moral order as 
defined in the literature. The first is shared individualism; while it is certainly possible that the sacredness 
of individual preferences can be a widely shared belief, Bellah and colleagues (1985), Joas (2000), and 
Smith (2003) have all pointed out that “sacred individual” subcultures are not capable of sustaining 
collective identity because they are not morally orienting in a way that is collectively actionable. The 
second condition is shared beliefs that are incidental to the life of the group. For example, the fact that a 
group’s members all prefer the color red is not likely to generate much solidarity. Moral order, as defined 
and measured here, is a combination of sharedness, importance, and action relevance. 
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“disagree strongly”) which indirectly tap the morally-orienting character of the group’s 
beliefs. The mean value of the survey question, “With respect to relations between 
husband and wife these days there are no clear guidelines to tell us what is right and what 
is wrong,” is used because it represents a common dilemma for organizing communal 
life. Individuals who belong to groups with morally-orienting cultures should have a clear 
sense of how marital relations ought to be organized, whether it be along traditional or 
egalitarian lines (Smith 1998:90). The next survey based item is the group’s mean value 
for the question: “I am skeptical of anything that tries to tell me the right way to live.” 
Again, following the definition of moral orders as orienting, groups with a strong moral 
order should have clear beliefs about the “right” way to live, whatever that may be. When 
combined into a scale, Cronbach’s alpha for these four items is .91.26 
While measures of belief unity and moral orientation capture the overall 
sharedness, importance, and morally-orienting character of the group’s ideology, the 
general type of organizing ideology may itself play a role. This is measured by dummy 
variables that reference the group typology decided on by the study investigators (i.e., 
Eastern religious, countercultural, etc.; Zablocki 1980). 
 
Additional Variables 
There are a few other factors that may relate to the overall level of Gemeinschaft 
in these groups that are not directly addressed by either structural or substantive theories. 
Several control variables will therefore be included in the multivariate analyses. Group 
size may not play a clear role here since even the largest communes are quite small in 
absolute terms. Nevertheless, the number of members in the group (aged 15 or more), is 
                                                 
26
 The results are substantively unchanged if the variance of these items is also included in the scale. 
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included here as a control variable. The age of the group (in years) is also considered 
since we might expect that groups with a longer history will have developed a stronger 
sense of community. Finally, I include a dummy variable coded 1 if the group derived 
from a prior organization or organized group, since it represents a prior association 
between at least some current commune members, and may therefore reflect a pre-
existing stock of we-feeling independent of current group characteristics. 
There are additional factors that have been examined in other studies of 
communes (e.g., Zablocki 1980) but that I do not include in this investigation. The first is 
the presence of “charisma,” and the second is the character of sexual relations in the 
group. I do not include these variables in the analysis because they do not fit well into 
either the structural or substantive theories of community that guide this study. Of course, 
I cannot simply exclude these variables without testing if their exclusion might bias the 
results. While ethnographer-coded charisma is positively associated with Gemeinschaft (ρ 
= .314) and “shifting sexual relationships” are negatively associated with it (ρ = -.653), 
neither is significant in the multivariate model below (p > .10). I therefore conclude that I 
am justified in excluding them from the analysis. 
 
 
Hypotheses and Note on Causality 
The bivariate hypotheses suggested by the theories are straightforward. High-
levels of spatio-temporal interaction, social homogeneity, authority, investment, and 
moral order should be positively related to the overall level of Gemeinschaft in these 
groups. Moreover, since these theories go beyond positing associations and offer specific 
mechanisms for producing the experience of community, we should expect their effects 
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to persist net of other factors. For example, if specific mechanisms of investment (such as 
the exclusion of free riders) are really operative, then the association between investment 
and we-feeling should persist even when other factors are controlled statistically. 
Otherwise, we would have to conclude that the bivariate relationship between investment 
and the experience of community exists because investment produces another 
phenomenon (or is itself produced by another phenomenon) which is the “real” (i.e., 
proximate) culprit. Thus, multivariate analysis will also be necessary to try to isolate the 
specific mechanisms at work in the production of community (see Ron 2002). The 
theories outlined above would lead us to hypothesize that interaction, homogeneity, 
authority, investment, and moral order will all be positively related to the experience of 
Gemeinschaft net of other factors. 
Finally, implicit in these hypotheses is that these mechanisms produce a sense of 
community instead of somehow being produced by it. Although theories of community 
treat the feeling of belonging as a “dependent variable,” it is possible that a group of 
people who already (for whatever reason) share a sense of community might come to 
desire and pursue more interaction or increased investment, or might be more willing to 
submit themselves to an authority or develop a shared moral vision. Perhaps more 
plausibly, causality may operate in both directions – certain mechanisms may lead to 
greater Gemeinschaft which in turn may lead to an increased intensity of (or willingness 
to accept) the original mechanism. Even though qualitative work and empirically-driven 
theory has pointed to the causal importance of these factors (e.g., Brint 2001; Kanter 
1972), there is no way to rule out alternative explanations in this investigation. The goal 
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of this study is thus to test which theoretical perspectives are most consistent with these 
particular cases and the empirical data at hand. 
 
Analytic Strategy 
The empirical analysis will proceed in three steps. The first step is to evaluate the 
simple associations between the presence of each of the mechanisms and the level of 
Gemeinschaft. Because many of the measures are categorical, I use polychoric 
correlations if one of the variables has fewer than 10 response categories. In each case, 
the experience of community will be measured by the continuous Gemeinschaft scale as 
defined above. These bivariate associations will provide a baseline for comparison with 
the multivariate analysis.  
Next, I simultaneously regress the Gemeinschaft scale on all of the variables 
defined above. Normally an analysis which relies so heavily on multiple measures of 
fairly abstract concepts such as Gemeinschaft or “investment” would be best handled 
using structural equations with latent variables (Bollen 1989). However, since there are 
too few cases in these data to allow me to take such an approach, I rely instead on OLS. I 
provide further details and analysis as needed. 
In the final step of the analysis, I use a modified version of fuzzy set analysis 
(FSA; Ragin 2000). Although regression is well suited to uncovering the proximate 
mechanisms linked to the outcome of interest, contemporary sociological theory holds 
that cultural schemas and material resources and practices must work together to generate 
social phenomena (Giddens 1984; Sewell 1992). This duality is hard to capture in 
regression models, since by design they pit explanatory variables against each other in a 
competition to explain variance. FSA, on the other hand, does not pit variables against 
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each other; instead, it looks at different configurations of the independent variables and 
compares their relationships to the outcome. Although FSA has its weaknesses, it is well-
suited to conditions where high levels of contingency are theorized as well as in 
situations with a moderate number of data points, both of which are true in the present 
case (Ragin 2000, 2006a). Since this method is not familiar to many readers, I discuss the 
exact procedure used in more detail below. 
One possible objection to this analytic strategy is that the way I have conceived of 
and measured moral order will “stack the deck” in its favor. This concern might arise 
from two quarters: first, since moral order and we-feeling are both “cultural” and 
subjective they might in fact be two measures of the same concept; and second, since 
communes are often thought of as explicitly organized around substantive ideological 
goals, this might also make moral order a more salient factor in these groups. While I 
cannot address these concerns definitively, I would like to consider each briefly.  
First, though moral order and we-feeling are indeed highly correlated in these data 
(.71), they are conceptually distinct in that they differentiate between belief organization 
on the one hand, and relational sentiment on the other. (As a thought experiment, it is 
very possible to think of people who share ideological goals and beliefs who nonetheless 
hate each other.) Also, despite the high overall correlation, the UCP ethographers were 
perfectly willing to code some communes as having a strong we-feeling and a not-so-
strong moral order—for instance, only 43 percent of all groups classified as having a 
strong sense of we-feeling were also classified as having high ideological homogeneity. 
In the minds of the ethnographers at least, these were not equivalent concepts. 
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In response to the second objection—that communes are universally centered 
around substantive ideological goals—I want to reemphasize that, despite popular 
stereotypes, communes differed greatly in their approach to communal life. Just as the 
theories outlined above distinguish between more procedural and more substantive 
approaches to community, so too did some groups emphasize collective procedures while 
others stressed collective ideology. “Cooperative living” communes, for example, were 
more focused on putting communal practices into place than on articulating a coherent 
ideology. “Old Plantation,” one of the urban communes described in Zablocki (1980), 
exemplifies this type of group. The stated goal of this group was to help its members 
“pursue [their] individual goals to the best of [their] ability. The pursuit of individual 
goals was seen to be facilitated by communal living” (Zablocki 1980:224, emphasis 
added). Here and in others of the UCP groups, communal life was viewed as an 
instrumental practice for individuals rather than an ideological goal in its own right. 
Reflecting this, the UCP ethnographers also distinguished between ideological 
importance and we-feeling: a full third of groups with strong we-feeling were coded as 
having only moderate or no role for ideology. Once again, we see that despite high 
correlations, these are not be the same concepts. Though the measures here are certainly 
not beyond question, thoughtful consideration of the theoretical, historical, and 
measurement issues involved can provide some confidence in their relative validity and 
reliability. (The supplemental analyses in Appendix B further demonstrate the robustness 
of the results to alternative specifications and measures.) 
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ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
Bivariate Analyses 
Table 3.1 shows the correlations between each of the theoretical variables and the 
Gemeinschaft scale. Nearly all of the measures of the theoretical mechanisms are 
positively related to the community scale, some quite strongly. There are exceptions, 
however. The measure of the commune’s interpersonal density is positively but not 
significantly related to the we-feeling. Another unexpected result was the absence of 
association between the experience of Gemeinschaft and the three homogeneity variables. 
There appears to be no connection in these groups between age, education, and class 
homogeneity and the overall sense of belonging. (Because this null relationship persisted 
into all multivariate analyses, the homophily hypothesis is rejected at this point and the 
social homogeneity variables are not considered further.) 
In general, the results here are consistent with much of the theoretical and 
qualitative work on community (e.g., Kanter 1972; Brint 2001; Keller 2003). Groups with 
more spatio-temporal interaction, higher levels of authority and investment, and stronger 
moral orders have higher levels of we-feeling. This is true both for the aggregated scales 
and for each of the individual measures. For the indicators of group type, there are also 
significant relationships. Christian groups are linked to a higher degree of community, 
while hippie, cooperative living, and psychological groups are associated with lower 
levels. This finding is unsurprising given Kanter’s (1972:136-138) analysis of the 
community-building practices often associated with religious groups. Finally, turning to 
the controls, Table 3.1 shows that groups that originated from previous groups have a 
higher level of Gemeinschaft. 
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These results paint a descriptive picture of the relationships between aspects of 
commune life and the phenomenological experience of Gemeinschaft. In almost all cases, 
the theoretical predictions based on previous literature have been supported. In order to 
go beyond simple description and toward an understanding of the mechanisms involved, I 
now turn to the multivariate analysis. 
 
Regression Models 
Table 3.2 shows the results of the regression of the Gemeinschaft scale on the four 
scales representing the theoretical mechanisms, as well as controls for group type and 
other relevant characteristics. Overall, the model fits the data very well, accounting for 
more than 75 percent of the variance in community experience between the groups. Only 
three of the regression coefficients are statistically significant at the .05 level – authority, 
investment, and moral order. The type of group, net of other factors, is unrelated to the 
level of we-feeling. Unexpectedly, the level of spatio-temporal interaction is not 
significantly related to the outcome. The interaction hypothesis is therefore rejected. The 
coefficient for authority is significant and quite large, but in the opposite direction from 
the theoretical expectation (β = -.595). The authority hypothesis is therefore rejected. The 
coefficient for investment, however, is both significant and positive (β = .374), 
suggesting that investment is positively related to we-feeling net of other factors. The 
investment hypothesis is thus supported. Finally, the coefficient for the strength of moral 
order is highly significant and very large – over two and a half times as large as the 
coefficient for investment (β = .936). Thus, we may conclude that, net of other factors, 
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the strength of moral order is strongly and positively associated with the community 
experience. The moral order hypothesis is therefore also supported.27 
Taken together, these results yield a number of findings. While there is support 
for the investment hypothesis, the structural theories as a whole have not performed as 
well in this particular test as one might have expected. There is little evidence to this 
point that the formal or structural community building mechanisms emphasized by 
Kanter (1972) and Brint (2001) actually play a “front line” role in creating a feeling of 
natural belonging. In that sense, characteristics such as frequent interactions, meetings, 
and authoritarian social control are not (strictly speaking) community-building 
mechanisms in these groups – they do not appear to directly lead to a greater level of 
Gemeinschaft (see Hedström and Swedberg 1998). In fact, there is evidence here that the 
direct effects of authority can be alienating.  
Substantive theory, on the other hand, has performed much better. In moving 
from the bivariate to the multivariate analyses, the strength of the association between 
moral order and we-feeling actually increased.28 The regression analyses are consistent 
with the idea that interaction, authority, and (to some extent) investment have positive 
total effects because of their tendency to be associated with moral order. The precise way 
in which these factors are interrelated is impossible to know with any certainty based on 
                                                 
27
 Diagnostic tests (available on request) showed that heteroskedasticity, mulitcollinearity, and influential 
cases did not significantly bias the results. Further, the substantive results from this model are extremely 
robust. Removing some of the single measures from the scales (both dependent and independent) and 
removing group type indicators or control variables does not appreciably change the conclusions. Nor does 
bootstrapping the standard errors. The results are also largely consistent if all measures are included 
individually. See Appendix B for additional results. 
 
28
 This is due to a statistical suppression effect—while the direct effect of authority is negative, it is 
positively associated with moral order; thus the total effect of moral order on the we-feeling is attenuated 
by its indirect effect via authority. When authority is statistically controlled, however, the “true” direct 
effect of moral order is revealed. 
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these analyses and given the cross-sectional nature of the data. But the regression models 
are consistent with the notion that, while structural and cultural arrangements may tend to 
co-occur, moral order is the proximate mechanism that leads to the production of we-
feeling in these groups. 
 
Fuzzy-Set Analysis 
As an alternative way to model causal complexity, I rely on fuzzy set analysis 
(FSA). Like its parent technique, QCA, FSA looks at simultaneous configurations of 
predictors rather than at net effects of single predictors (Ragin 2000, 2006a; Roscigno 
and Hodson 2004).29 Unlike QCA, however, FSA does not require that variables be 
defined dichotomously. For instance, rather than defining a commune’s level of 
investment as “high” (1) or “low” (0), it can be coded continuously from 0 to 1. To 
convert the Gemeinschaft scale and the four main predictors into fuzzy sets here, I use a 
procedure analogous to the median split employed by Roscigno and Hodson (2004). I 
rank each commune on the variable from 1 to 50 and then rescale the resulting ranking so 
that it varies between 0 and 1 with .5 as the median. (Other transformations, including the 
cumulative normal and the ridit transformation, produced nearly identical results.) This 
procedure does not satisfy Ragin’s (2000) or Smithson and Verkuilen’s (2006) demand 
for a theory- or knowledge-based coding of fuzzy sets. This strategy is necessary and 
justified, however, for three reasons. First, I do not have in-depth knowledge on all 50 
cases and cannot acquire it three decades after the fact. Second, given the high 
                                                 
29
 Though they seem similar, QCA/FSA configurations are very different from GLM interaction terms. For 
instance, an “A × B” interaction term would take on equivalent values if A were high and B were low or 
vice-versa. QCA/FSA treats these as separate types of cases. Also, in FSA, set values are not multiplied 
together, but rather the minimum value is taken (see below). Thus the set-theoretic logic of QCA/FSA is 
not easily translatable in terms of the GLM, with or without interaction terms (see Ragin 2000; Roscigno 
and Hodson 2004; Smithson and Verkuilen 2006). 
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correlations between the predictors, there will tend to be a number of sparse cells in the 
FSA truth table; a median-based coding strategy minimizes this problem by creating 
maximal empirical diversity (i.e., the fewest sparse or empty cells). Finally, this coding 
strategy is justifiable in the present context because the original sampling design makes 
these groups the closest available approximation to a random sample from the population 
of urban communes in 1974. The set values attached to each commune can therefore be 
substantively interpreted relative to that population of groups.30   
FSA assesses the empirical relationship between all possible combinations of the 
predictors and the outcome of interest. The four predictors are spatio-temporal interaction 
(S), authority (A), investment (I), and moral order (M), which means there are 24 or 16 
possible set configurations. FSA analyzes the extent to which each configuration is a 
subset of the outcome because subsetness is evidence of logical sufficiency. In other 
words, if X is a subset of Y, one can also say “if X, then Y.” To determine whether, say, 
communes with high interaction, low authority, low investment, and high moral order 
(S·a·i·M)31 are subsets of Gemeinschaft, one computes the inclusion coefficient of the 
configuration in the outcome set. The inclusion coefficient is estimated using equation 1, 
                                                 
30
 Though this analysis relies on fuzzy sets, there are descriptive advantages to dichotomizing the variables 
at the median and generating a 16 cell table (see Appendix A, Table A3). We see that a substantial majority 
of communes (60 percent) are best described as either high or low on all four key predictors. “Off-
diagonal” cases are much rarer, but are also most theoretically interesting for this study. While the 
regression results indicate that communes with high moral order, high investment, and low authority should 
be the most Gemeinschaft-like, there is, in fact, only one group in the data that fits that profile. This means, 
among other things, that there would be too little power to model causal complexity using interaction terms 
even though the coding used here minimizes the incidence of empty cells. Because QCA/FSA makes the 
(lack of) diversity in the data explicit, is has distinct advantages for examining causal complexity. 
 
31
 These configurations are labeled, according to convention, with capital letters signifying 1(“high”) and 
lowercase letters signifying 0 (“low”). In the fuzzy set case, “high” simply means the set membership (e.g., 
S) and “low” means 1-the set membership (e.g., 1-S). The operator “•” stands for the Boolean “and” which 
means “take the minimum value of these sets.” Thus, S•a•I•m would be translated “high interaction and 
low authority and high investment and low moral order,” or in quantitative terms, would be the minimum 
value of S, (1-A), I, and (1-M). 
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where X stands for one of the 16 configurations (S·A·I·M, S·A·I·m, S·A·i·M, and so on), 
Y stands for the outcome set, and xi and yi stand for each commune’s membership score 
on X and Y, respectively (Ragin 2006b; Smithson and Verkuilen 2006). The resulting 
number is akin to a fuzzy conditional probability, with numbers closer to 1 signifying a 
closer empirical correspondence to a subset relation or, equivalently, the logical 
statement “if X, then Y.” Here, I compare IXY and IX(1-Y) using a Wald F-test, which 
means that, for each configuration, I simply ask whether the data are more consistent with 
calling that configuration a sufficient condition for the presence of we-feeling (Y) or a 
sufficient condition for the absence of we-feeling (1-Y). Where the difference between 
IXY and IX(1-Y) is not statistically significant, the configuration’s relationship to the 
outcome is considered ambiguous. 
Because the 16 configurations are fuzzily defined, individual communes can be 
partial members of multiple configurations. Some configurations are highly correlated 
with each other because communes tend to have similar scores in both.32 Because some 
of the configurations are empirically quite rare (i.e., they tend to have low membership 
values), I use a data-driven strategy to reduce the number of overall configurations (see 
Roscigno and Hodson 2004 for a crisp set approach to reducing the number of 
configurations). The technique used here, clustering around latent variables (CLV), uses 
the correlation matrix of the configurations to combine those that are the most 
empirically similar to each other in a step-by-step manner (Vigneau and Qannari 2003). 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
32
 For example, a commune with S=.80, A=.70, I=.52, and M=.75 would have very similar membership 
scores in S·A·I·M (.52) and in S·A·i·M (.48). Any commune with nonzero membership on all four predictor 
sets will be a member of all 16 possible configurations to some extent. 
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Based on theory and the findings of the regression analyses, the typology that best 
combines parsimony and complexity seems to be the one that distinguishes between six 
types of groups: 1) all high (S•A•I•M); 2) all low (s•a•i•m); 3) all other high authority, 
high moral order groups besides S•A•I•M (other A•M); 4) high authority, low moral 
order groups (A•m); 5) low authority, high moral order groups (a•M); and 6) all other low 
authority, low moral order groups besides s•a•i•m (other a•m). This provides a good mix 
of extreme types as well as “off diagonal” types that are of particular theoretical 
interest.33 
Table 3.3 shows the results of the tests for all six groups. Only one configuration, 
S•A•I•M, is significantly more Gemeinschaft-like than not. That is, the data are more 
consistent with the assertion that S•A•I•M is a subset of the outcome (Y) than with the 
assertion that S•A•I•M is a subset of the absence of the outcome (1-Y). This highlights 
the fact that moral order and structural arrangements must work together to produce the 
experience of Gemeinschaft in a consistent way (see Giddens 1984; Sewell 1992). In 
contrast to what the regression suggests, moral order alone does not appear sufficient to 
produce we-feeling. Conversely, three of the groups are more included in 1-Y than in Y: 
the all low set (s•a•i•m), and both of the other low moral order sets (A•m and other a•m). 
In other words, all of the configurations that contain the low moral order element (m) are 
better thought of as not Gemeinschaft-like. While a high level of moral order is therefore 
not sufficient by itself to produce we-feeling, the fuzzy analysis suggests that its absence 
may be sufficient to prevent it. In logical terms, then, we can conclude that moral order is 
an INUS condition for Gemeinschaft—an insufficient but necessary part of all 
                                                 
33
 This cluster solution accounts for 79.2 of the variance, as defined by the sum of the first eigenvalues of 
all six clusters (12.67) divided by the total number of variables (16). For separate tests of all 16 possible 
configurations, see Appendix B, Table B3. 
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unnecessary but sufficient conditions (Mackie 1965). That it, while the presence or 
absence of moral order is not sufficient in its own right to produce or prevent the we-
feeling, it is a necessary part of of all the recipes that are sufficient to do so.  Detecting 
such conditions is beyond the scope of regression and gives us new insight into the 
structure-culture relationship in these groups. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The combined results of the regression and fuzzy set approaches warrant a 
number of empirical inferences. First, the findings here strongly support the hypotheses 
advanced by substantive theories of community: there is good evidence that moral order 
is a vital dimension of producing the experience of Gemeinschaft in these groups. 
Conversely, there is little evidence that interaction, authority, or (to a lesser extent) 
investment can—on their own—produce the experience of community in such groups.  
Second, it may be that moral order intervenes to explain the bivariate association 
between we-feeling and the structural variables in communes because interaction, 
investment, and authority tend themselves to co-occur with moral order. Strong authority 
may appear to “work,” for example, because its indirect positive relationship to we-
feeling via its association with moral order is greater than its direct alienating effects. 
Both Martin (2002) and Sewell (1999) have previously argued that social power has the 
ability to organize cultural beliefs, which would account for the co-occurrence of 
authority and moral order, but other explanations are certainly plausible. It may be, for 
example, that groups with strong moral orders are willing to accept stricter authorities 
because they see them as legitimate. Ultimately, however, because we cannot isolate 
causal order with any precision, any specific interpretation must remain speculative. 
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Third, despite the findings of the regression models, it would be unwise to 
downplay the importance of structural factors here. FSA showed that moral order is only 
sufficient to produce community in the presence of particular structural arrangements. 
While regression is indeed useful for uncovering the most proximate factors producing 
the outcome, it is in a sense overly simplistic because its “struggle for variance” logic 
does not capture well the potential complementary relationships between important 
factors. Even the inclusion of interaction terms in regression does not model causal 
complexity in the same way as FSA (see Ragin 2000, 2006a). 
The fuzzy set analyses also suggest that while the existence of moral order is not 
sufficient in and of itself to produce we-feeling, the absence of moral order is sufficient to 
prevent it. A plausible interpretation of this result can be found in the work of Charles 
Taylor (2003), who argues that moral orders provide “hermeneutic keys” for interpreting 
practices – that is, for answering the common query, “Why are we doing this again?” 
Though it is not always the case, communal life can be particularly demanding in terms 
of time, resources, freedom, and other generally valued goods. If actors don’t have some 
shared, collective sense of why they are going to meetings, making food for other people, 
submitting to authority, and so on, how could they continue to feel that these efforts were 
worthwhile? Authority, in particular, appears to be alienating in the absence of shared 
moral order, at least in these groups. 
The findings also highlight the importance of using regression and FSA together. 
By combining two analytical approaches into a single investigation, we have gained a 
much greater understanding of how different types of communes and the social 
mechanisms in each are related to the experience of community. Neither regression nor 
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FSA alone could have provided such a nuanced understanding of the interplay of cultural 
and structural factors in this sample of communes.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper seeks to contribute to debates in the literature on intentional 
communities, community studies, and the social capital literature by disentangling some 
of the processes at work in the creation of the experience of community. Since the 
findings are based on a study of communes in a particular time and place, the results here 
are not necessarily generalizable to other face-to-face groups, much less to non-localized 
forms of community such as race or ethnicity. Communes are different in important ways 
from other kinds of organizations. They typically (but not always) demand higher 
investments than other forms of association; they are more face-to-face and personal 
rather than, say, nations, professions, or religious traditions; and these particular groups 
arose out a particular culturally- and historically-specific time in United States history 
(Zablocki 1980). I have argued, however, that the groups under consideration here are far 
more diverse than one might expect given the sterotype of “commune” and that they 
therefore serve as a fruitful window for exploring some general processes that previous 
work has linked theoretically to the we-feeling. On the face of it, one might expect face-
to-face, bounded, and voluntary groups with solidarity as an explicit goal (like religious 
congregrations or social movement chapters) to be more like communes than other 
organizations, but this remains speculative. Ultimately generalizability is, strictly 
speaking, an empirical question. Future research will have to determine the extent to 
which these findings are applicable to other settings. 
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 Despite their limitations in scope, these findings do lend credibility to Etzioni’s 
(2001) claims about the moral underpinnings of trust and social capital. More empirical 
research is needed, but these analyses suggest that cultural theories that emphasize moral 
order may be an important corrective to the structuralist determinism that seems to 
pervade the social capital and network literature (see Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). In 
the case of these communes, at least, the key point is this: contrary to Putnam (2000:19) 
and others, reciprocity and trustworthiness do not simply “arise” from social networks, 
except, perhaps, as that interaction is either animated by or productive of shared moral 
understandings. Even in previous study of communes, this fact has been surprisingly 
underappreciated. 
To the extent these findings can be generalized to religious congregations as a 
related form of face-to-face community, this paper also casts some doubt on the 
“strictness” theory of religious vitality (e.g., Iannaccone 1994), at least insofar as it offers 
a mechanism for actually producing satisfying group life. The level of required 
investment does not appear to matter as much (at least directly) as the presence of 
“morally orienting collective identities” (Smith 1998:90). This paper, then, has taken a 
small step toward adjudicating between two theories that produce very similar predictions 
at the denominational level. While the FSA results show that high investment and strong 
moral orders usually co-occur, the regression analyses suggest that moral order is a more 
likely candidate mechanism for directly producing the experience of community. If 
sociologists are to move beyond the description of empirical regularities to explanatory 
theory in this area, more empirical research is needed that can isolate the specific 
processes at work (see Hedström and Swedberg 1998; Danermark et al. 2002).  
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In emphasizing the importance of moral order, my objective is not to imply that 
cultural belief structures are determinative of structures or practices, nor to suggest that 
moral orders are static, immutable things that hegemonically define meanings for social 
actors. Because of the need for resources to enact and sustain moral orders, they are 
subject to being influenced through the exercise of economic or political power (see 
Sewell 1999; Smith 2003; Wuthnow 1989). Furthermore, social structures themselves are 
inherently polysemous – that is, in their relationship with human actors they contain an 
interpretive flexibility that allows (even requires) cultural improvisation and change that 
can in turn affect the distribution of resources (Sewell 1992). The structure-culture 
relationship is one of complexity and dualism rather than of determinism.  
Indeed, one of the primary advantages of FSA is that it helps us transcend either-
or determinisms on the one hand and the unhelpful assertion that both structure and 
culture “matter” on the other. Because it explicitly models how different factors combine 
to produce outcomes, FSA is a method that corresponds well with our best theories of 
structural-cultural interplay. Nearly every subfield of sociology posits a complex working 
relationship between structure and culture, but general linear methods often force us to pit 
them against each other in ways alien to our theories. Economic sociology (e.g., Dobbin 
2004), social movements (e.g., McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001), and social psychology 
(e.g., Ridgeway 2006), to name only a few, are subfields that are struggling to think about 
and model the relationship between networks, resources, and cultural schemas. Using 
FSA in conjunction with regression analyses would allow investigating both proximate 
mechanisms and structure-culture interplay using the same data and cases. This paper has 
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shown some of the benefits of this strategy for understanding how structure and culture 
lead to—or prevent—the experience of Gemeinschaft in a sample of urban communes. 
Finally, the substantive issues in this study go beyond a mere academic interest. It 
is the human experience of alienation and anomie that has inspired social theorists and 
lay people alike to ponder – and attempt – the creation of community. Since Tönnies and 
Durkheim wrote about these issues more than a century ago, the problem of modernity’s 
“Great Disembedding” has not gone away (Taylor 2003:50). Human beings are still left 
to attempt to “re-embed” themselves in ways that will not do undue violence to their 
freedom or autonomy, while simultaneously trying to find sources of shared meaning and 
purpose. As the experience of these communes shows, this is not a simple or 
straightforward process. Yet perhaps work in this area will help us find better and better 
answers to a foundational sociological – and human – question: “Where can I be at 
home?” 
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Table 3.1. Correlations between Gemeinschaft Scale and All Predictor Variables 
ρ s.e. ρ s.e.
SPATIO-TEMPORAL .355 .155 ** MORAL ORDER .713 .094 ***
Meetings .352 .122 ** Ideological unity .707 .084 ***
Eating together .456 .126 *** Importance of ideology .693 .069 ***
Density .124 .133  Role certainty .580 .116 ***
"How to live" .564 .119 ***
AUTHORITARIANISM .379 .124 **
Authoritarian governance .337 .125 ** TYPE OF GROUP n/a
Extent of authority .364 .145 * Eastern religious .330 .202  
Number of rules .469 .112 *** Christian .688 .153 ***
Political .053 .208  
INVESTMENT .543 .122 *** Counter cultural (hippie) -.362 .155 *
Time spent .301 .136 * Alternative family -.169 .225  
Communism .630 .081 *** Household -.489 .157 **
Bar to entry .441 .172 * Personal Growth -.256 .117 *
Assigned chores .714 .111 ***
CONTROLS n/a
HOMOGENEITY n/a Size of group -.033 .134  
Age .044 .141 Age of group .123 .119  
Education .178 .139 Evolved from previous .538 .152 ***
Class -.193 .139
Notes: Bolded statistics are for scale measurements.  Categorical variables use polychoric correlations.  
Other variables use Pearson's r .  N/a = not applicable.
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Table 3.2. OLS Regression of Gemeinschaft scale on Independent Variables 
MECHANISMS b β t  
Spatio-temporal intensity -.281 -.192 -1.300  
Authority -.665 -.595 -3.170 ** 
Investment .485 .374 2.460 ** 
Strength of moral order 1.033 .936 4.360 *** 
    
GROUP TYPES    
Eastern religious (reference)  
Christian .403 .153 1.470 
Political .315 .106 .780 
Counter cultural -.095 -.034 -.220 
Alternative family .655 .203 1.410 
Household -.050 -.018 -.110 
Personal growth .250 .061 .490 
    
CONTROLS    
Size of group -.017 -.155 -1.310 
Age of group .118 .191 2.010 
Evolved from previous .457 .220 1.790 
    
CONSTANT -.464  -1.630 
N   50 
R²   .754 
Adjusted R²     .665 
    
Notes: * = p<.05; ** = p<.01; *** = p<.001 (two-tailed) 
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Table 3.3. Testing Fuzzy Inclusion for the Six Reduced Configurations 
 Inclusion in… Difference  
Configuration Y (1-Y) F p  
S•A•I•M .882 .575 11.15 .002 ** 
s•a•i•m .632 .880 6.27 .016 * 
other A•M .903 .805 1.87 .178  
A•m .733 .928 5.74 .020 * 
a•M .914 .819 1.59 .214  
other a•m .737 .896 3.24 .078 + 
Note: Y = inclusion coefficent in high Gemeinschaft set; (1-Y) = inclusion coefficient in 1-Y; F = the 
value of the Wald F-test of the difference between the coefficients (df = 1, 49); p = the p-value of the F-
test; ** = p < .01; * = p < .05; + = p < .10 
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APPENDIX 1: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 1 
Most of the control variables used in the analyses (see Table 1A) are either self-
explanatory or can be found in the documentation at youthandreligion.org. I only note 
below variables that I constructed especially for these analyses. 
Parent closeness is the maximum value of the closeness variable reported by the 
respondent for either parent. The resulting value was standardized (in the full sample) to 
have mean = 0 and SD = 1. 
Network closure was constructed from three variables that were asked of each 
respondent’s social network. For each reported friend, the respondent was asked, which 
of these friends, 1) “(do/does) your [PARENT TYPE] not really know that well”; 2) 
“have parents who know YOU by name”; 3) “have parents who know your [PARENT 
TYPE] well enough to call (him/her/them) on the phone.” These responses were 
combined (the first was reverse coded) to give a sense of how much adult networks were 
closed around the respondent. The resulting sum (0-15) was divided by 3 to make it 
comparable to the other network measures. 
GPA was constructed from the variable “grades” (y91), which asked, “What kind 
of grades do you usually get in school?” The original responses were 10 ordinal 
categories ranging from “all As” to “mostly Fs” with an additional category for “mixed” 
(n=159). The GPA scale used in these analyses was made into a scale with range 0 to 4 
by rescaling the 10 point ordinal scale and setting the “mixed” responses to the sample 
mean. 
Parent education is the highest level of education for either parent, measured on a 
12-point ordinal scale. 
  116 
Table 1A. Descriptive Statistics for All Variables 
 N Mean SD Min Max 
Smoking Pot (W2) 2498 1.73 1.61 1 7 
Smoking Pot  2525 1.36 .76 1 4 
Volunteering (W2) 2515 2.15 1.03 1 4 
Volunteering  2526 2.12 1.00 1 4 
# Friends Use Drugs  2526 .70 1.32 0 5 
# Friends Volunteer Regularly  2499 .99 1.42 0 5 
# Friends Similar Religious Beliefs 2530 2.63 2.06 0 5 
Utilitarian Schema 2489 .11 .31 0 1 
Relational Schema 2489 .42 .49 0 1 
Theistic Schema 2489 .21 .41 0 1 
Parent Closeness 2527 -.01 1.00 -4.12 1.22 
Network Closure 2530 3.37 1.22 0 5 
Church Attendance 2526 3.22 2.19 0 6 
Evangelical Protestant 2530 .33 .47 0 1 
Mainline Protestant 2530 .12 .32 0 1 
Black Protestant 2530 .11 .32 0 1 
Catholic 2530 .24 .43 0 1 
Jewish 2530 .02 .13 0 1 
Mormon 2530 .02 .15 0 1 
Other Religion 2530 .03 .16 0 1 
Indeterminate Religion 2530 .02 .15 0 1 
Female  2530 .50 .50 0 1 
Age 2530 15.46 1.42 12.95 18.49 
Black 2530 .16 .37 0 1 
Other race 2530 .15 .36 0 1 
South 2530 .41 .49 0 1 
Midwest 2530 .24 .43 0 1 
West 2530 .20 .40 0 1 
GPA 2444 2.89 .68 0 4 
Number of Friends 2504 4.78 .68 1 5 
Parent Income 2386 6.09 2.89 1 11 
Parent Education 2525 7.53 2.64 0 12 
Two-Parent Bio HH 2530 .71 .45 0 1 
      
Unless otherwise noted, variables are taken from NSYR Wave 1. Summary statistics are 
for respondents who answered both waves of the survey. 
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APPENDIX 2: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 2 
Most of the control variables used in the analyses (see Table 2A) are either self-
explanatory or can be found in the documentation at youthandreligion.org. I only note 
below variables that I constructed especially for these analyses. 
Parent closeness is the maximum value of the closeness variable reported by the 
respondent for either parent. The resulting value was standardized (in the full sample) to 
have mean = 0 and SD = 1. 
Network closure was constructed from three variables that were asked of each 
respondent’s social network. For each reported friend, the respondent was asked, which 
of these friends, 1) “(do/does) your [PARENT TYPE] not really know that well”; 2) 
“have parents who know YOU by name”; 3) “have parents who know your [PARENT 
TYPE] well enough to call (him/her/them) on the phone.” These responses were 
combined (the first was reverse coded) to give a sense of how much adult networks were 
closed around the respondent. The resulting sum (0-15) was divided by 3 to make it 
comparable to the other network measures. 
GPA was constructed from the variable “grades” (y91), which asked, “What kind 
of grades do you usually get in school?” The original responses were 10 ordinal 
categories ranging from “all As” to “mostly Fs” with an additional category for “mixed” 
(n=159). The GPA scale used in these analyses was made into a scale with range 0 to 4 
by rescaling the 10 point ordinal scale and setting the “mixed” responses to the sample 
mean. 
Parent education is the highest level of education for either parent, measured on a 
12-point ordinal scale. 
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Table 2A. Descriptive Statistics for All Variables 
 
 N Mean SD Min Max 
# Ties Use Drugs/Drink a Lot (W2) 2494 1.76 1.79 0 5 
# Ties Volunteer Regularly (W2) 2456 1.27 1.47 0 5 
# Ties Use Drugs /Drink a Lot 2526 .70 1.32 0 5 
# Ties Volunteer Regularly  2499 .99 1.42 0 5 
Volunteering  2526 2.12 1.00 1 4 
Smoking Pot  2525 1.36 .76 1 4 
Getting Drunk 2528 1.44 .95 1 6 
Expressivist Worldview 2489 .26 .44 0 1 
Utilitarian Worldview 2489 .11 .31 0 1 
Theistic Worldview 2489 .21 .41 0 1 
Moral Relativism 2444 .47 .50 0 1 
# Ties Similar Religious Beliefs 2530 2.63 2.06 0 5 
Parent Closeness 2527 -.01 1.00 -4.12 1.22 
Network Closure 2530 3.37 1.22 0 5 
# of Strong Ties 2504 4.78 .68 1 5 
Church Attendance 2526 3.22 2.19 0 6 
Evangelical Protestant 2530 .33 .47 0 1 
Mainline Protestant 2530 .12 .32 0 1 
Black Protestant 2530 .11 .32 0 1 
Catholic 2530 .24 .43 0 1 
Jewish 2530 .02 .13 0 1 
Mormon 2530 .02 .15 0 1 
Other Religion 2530 .03 .16 0 1 
Indeterminate Religion 2530 .02 .15 0 1 
Female  2530 .50 .50 0 1 
Age 2530 15.46 1.42 12.95 18.49 
Black 2530 .16 .37 0 1 
Other race 2530 .15 .36 0 1 
South 2530 .41 .49 0 1 
GPA 2444 2.89 .68 0 4 
Number of Friends 2504 4.78 .68 1 5 
Parent Income 2386 6.09 2.89 1 11 
Parent Education 2525 7.53 2.64 0 12 
Two-Parent Bio HH 2530 .71 .45 0 1 
      
Unless otherwise noted, variables are taken from NSYR Wave 1. Summary statistics are 
for respondents who answered both waves of the survey. 
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APPENDIX 3: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 3 
Tables 3A, 3B, and 3C present additional descriptive statistics from the data used 
in the paper. The remaining tables in this Appendix contain information regarding checks 
for robustness that were performed using different multivariate specifications. 
The scaled measures in the main text were constructed a priori using substantive 
and theoretical knowledge both of communes and of the community literature more 
generally. However, I replicate the findings in two ways using the individual measures. In 
general terms the same substantive conclusions emerge from these tables as from the 
analyses in the main text.  
In Table 3D, which regresses the six individual Gemeinschaft variables on the 
predictor scales and controls, moral order is significant in five of six models, while 
investment is only significant in one. Authority and spatio-temporal interaction alternate 
between null and negative effects. These results are consistent with the claims about the 
importance of moral order, the lesser importance of investment, and the negative net 
effect of authority. They also show that the results are not dependent upon a particular 
definition of the Gemeinschaft scale. 
Table 3E, which regresses the Gemeinschaft scale and its six component parts on 
all individual variables, is also consistent with these general interpretations. The 
interaction and authority variables mostly alternate between null and negative effects, 
although one or two positive and significant coefficients do emerge in different models. 
Most noteworthy is that interpersonal density is nearly always negatively related to the 
outcome. This suggests that—like authority—close personal proximity may also be 
alienating absent other factors. The investment variables produce four positive 
coefficients, and a majority of null coefficients, consistent with the interpretation that 
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investment plays a modest direct role in the production of Gemeinschaft. The individual 
moral order variables are the most consistent, with each producing between two and five 
positive coefficients. These results also show that while the ethographer-coded measures 
are the most powerful, no single measure is driving the results by itself. These additional 
results should increase confidence in the regression analyses conducted above. 
Table 3F shows the results of the FSA for all 16 configurations of the predictor 
sets. While the clustered analysis is probably more justified because it deals with types of 
communes that have a greater presence in the data, Table B3 shows that the overall 
findings are robust to a simpler analysis. The column marked “p” shows the p-value of 
the F-test of the differences between IXY and IX(1-Y). Because the non-extreme types are so 
rare in the data, only the inclusion coefficients for S·A·I·M and s·a·i·m are different at the 
.05 level. Both s·A·i·m and S·a·i·m are significant at the .10 level, and three additional 
configurations (s·A·I·M, S·A·i·m, and S·A·I·m) come in very close to that at p < .105. 
After that, the p-values jump up very significantly. If we take these seven configurations 
and assess their relationship to the data (allowing a bit of leeway on the p-values due to 
low sample size), the same basic pattern emerges. The two sets sharing A·I·M are best 
considered Gemeinschaft-like. On the other hand, the five sets that are best thought of as 
not Gemeinschaft-like combine low moral order (m) with either high interaction and 
authority (S·A) or low investment (i). While not all eight sets containing low moral order 
(m) have IX(1-Y) > IXY, this is partly due to the fact that they are not all adequately 
represented in the data (see Table A3). (The goal of the clustering algorithm used in the 
main text is to combine rare types together into similar supersets that can be adequately 
tested.) In general terms, however, Table 3F is consistent with the conclusions reached 
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above: 1) structural and cultural factors must work together to produce the we-feeling; 
and 2) moral order, while neither necessary nor sufficient in its own right, can be best 
thought of as an INUS condition for producing the we-feeling, and its absence as an 
INUS condition for producing the absence of we-feeling. 
 
Table 3A. Descriptive Statistics for All Variables 
Variable mean sd min max
GEMEINSHAFT 0.09 0.98 -2.09 1.65
Observer "we-feeling" 3.29 0.94 1 4
True family 3.42 1.08 1 5
Look out for selves (reverse) 4.01 0.82 1.75 5
No one cares (reverse) 4.69 0.30 3.67 5
Live communally in 10 years 2.62 0.76 1 4
Rejects money to leave 0.46 0.27 0 1
SPATIO-TEMPORAL -0.02 0.67 -1.27 2.15
Meetings per month 4.38 5.98 0 30
Frequency of eating together 2.10 0.84 0 4
Density (ln[persons/room]) -0.21 0.45 -1.18 1.72
HOMOGENEITY (no scale)
Age -0.01 1.00 -3.34 1.18
Education 0.03 1.01 -0.89 3.15
Father's prestige ("class") 0.02 1.00 -2.25 1.54
AUTHORITARIANISM -0.06 0.88 -1.15 1.34
Extent of authority 1.58 1.16 0 3
Extent of rules 2.66 0.96 1 4
Authoritarian governance 2.76 2.39 0 6
INVESTMENT 0.00 0.76 -1.07 1.62
Economic communism 2.56 0.95 1 4
Assigned chores 0.28 0.45 0 1
Bar to entry 0.32 0.47 0 1
Average hours last 3 days 49.61 10.28 30.6 70.5
MORAL ORDER 0.03 0.89 -1.48 1.55
Ideological unity 2.58 1.05 1 4
Importance of ideology 2.28 0.78 1 3
Marital role certainty 3.22 1.07 1.40 5
"How to live" 2.82 1.00 1.20 5
CONTROLS (no scale)
Group size 10.42 9.11 5 67
Group age 1.50 1.58 0 8
Evolved from previous group 0.68 0.47 0 1
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Table 3B.  Correlations Between All Variables Used in the Main Explanatory Model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Gemeinschaft 1.000
(2) Spatio-temporal 0.355 * 1.000
(3) Authoritarianism 0.379 * 0.708 * 1.000
(4) Investment 0.543 * 0.706 * 0.776 * 1.000
(5) Moral order 0.713 * 0.684 * 0.771 * 0.727 * 1.000
(6) Previous group 0.538 * 0.734 * 0.733 * 0.658 * 0.807 * 1.000
(7) Group size -0.033 0.468 * 0.302 * 0.273 0.230 0.889 1.000
(8) Group age 0.123 0.242 0.204 0.166 0.008 -0.131 0.234 1.000
Notes: all correlations involving items (6) and (8) use the polychoric correlation coefficient (ρ ); all other use 
Pearson's r .  * = p <.05 (two-tailed tests).
 
 
 
Table 3C. Diversity of Commune Types 
Spatio-
temporal Authority Investment 
Moral 
order N  
Low low low low 13 
Low low low high 1 
Low low high low 4 
Low low high high 1 
Low high low low 2 
Low high low high 2 
Low high high low 0 
Low high high high 2 
High low low low 3 
High low low high 1 
High low high low 1 
High low high high 0 
High high low low 2 
High high low high 1 
High high high low 0 
High high high high 17 
     
Note: Scales divided at medians with 25 high and 25 
low in each category.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  123 
Table 3D.  Coefficients from the Regression of All Gemeinschaft Variables on 
Independent Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MECHANISMS
Spatio-temporal intensity .907 -.420 + -.198 -.176 + .029 -.012
Authority -1.414 -.144 -.794 ** -.097 -.583 * -.098
Investment 1.357 .165 .627 ** .071 .312 .085
Strength of moral order 1.811 + 1.141 ** .417 .321 ** .676 ** .164 +
GROUP TYPES
Eastern religious (reference)
Christian 1.962 -.342 .052 .248 * .041 .324 **
Political .935 -.175 -.263 .402 * -.114 .142
Counter cultural -.209 -.005 -.991 * .307 + -.017 .066
Alternative family .899 .625 -.153 .442 * -.068 .325 +
Cooperative living .803 -.587 -.790 .383 * -.463 .219
Psychological 1.356 .953 + -.642 .028 .628 -.025
CONTROLS
Size of group -.079 -.028 + .017 -.008 -.012 -.007
Age of group .556 .103 -.001 .032 .108 + .023
Previous origin 2.352 * .361 .280 .050 .013 .141
Constant 3.313 ** 3.900 ** 4.432 ** 2.562 ** .248 *
R² - .78 .59 .59 .57 .56
Adjusted count R² .41 - - - - -
Notes: coefficients are logits in model 1 (ordered logit), standardized regression coefficients (β) in models 2-6 (OLS).   + = 
p <.10; * = p <.05; ** = p <.01 (two-tailed tests)
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Table 3E. Regressions of Dependent Variables on all Individual Scale Variables 
Meetings/month  .110  .033  .040  .029 -.040  .161  .294*
Eating -.132  .098 -.363* -.245 -.269  .156  .036
Interpersonal density -.527*  .052 -.353+ -.375 -.621* -.427+ -.699*
Extent of Authority -.361+  .624*  .062 -.630+ -.782* -.559+ -.333
Extent of Rules  .183  .230 -.042  .209  .414+ -.199  .251
Authoritarian Gov. -.352+ -1.132** -.135 -.396  .238 -.080 -.132
Communism -.025 -.135  .055  .110 -.092  .163 -.244
Assigned Chores -.046 -.005 -.066  .156 -.198  .037 -.155
Bar to Entry  .158+  .235*  .072  .085 -.047  .202+  .184
Avg. hours, last 3 days  .070 -.132 -.007  .160  .332* -.078  .042
Ideological unity  .668**  .894**  .466*  .422+  .344  .296  .669*
Importance of ideology  .637**  .495*  .254  .180  .616*  .835**  .550*
Marital role certainty  .184 -.396+  .181  .481+  .631* -.023 -.066
"How to live"  .130  .299+  .318* -.132 -.068  .045  .144
Group size  .026 -.354* -.157  .375+  .175 -.021  .090
Group age  .136  .174+  .201+ -.008  .137  .114  .002
Evolved from previous  .163  .354*  .215+  .205 -.199 -.060  .243+
Eastern (reference)
Christian  .122  .255+ -.189+ -.003  .224+ -.041  .344*
Political  .090  .336* -.132 -.019  .345* -.162  .068
Counterculture  .143  .645** -.184 -.345  .421+ -.031  .199
Alternative family  .270+  .494**  .074  .028  .369+ -.102  .413*
Cooperative living  .141  .589** -.262 -.265  .408+ -.190  .429+
Psychological  .093  .012  .137 -.006  .052  .246 -.028
R2  .847  .825  .829  .689  .742  .765  .736
adj. R2  .694  .642  .659  .378  .484  .531  .471
Gemein. 
scale
NOTES: Standardized beta coefficients from OLS models. Observer we-feeling also uses OLS because ML results 
were unstable with a high number of covariates. + = p<.10; * = p<.05; ** = p<.01 (one-tailed tests)
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Table 3F. Inclusion Ratios for All Configurations 
Configuration IXY IX(1-Y) F p 
saim .632 .880 6.27 .016 
saiM .920 .857 .97 .330 
saIm .803 .891 .81 .372 
saIM .939 .843 1.40 .242 
sAim .776 .928 3.74 .059 
sAiM .919 .878 .43 .517 
sAIm .867 .913 .41 .523 
sAIM .938 .829 2.73 .105 
Saim .810 .934 2.86 .097 
SaiM .928 .892 .30 .586 
SaIm .865 .931 1.21 .276 
SaIM .948 .864 1.57 .217 
SAim .782 .945 2.77 .102 
SAiM .923 .847 1.09 .303 
SAIm .856 .952 2.73 .105 
SAIM .882 .575 11.15 .002 
 
NOTE: “and” operator omitted from set titles 
 
